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ABSTRACT
Evaluation studies can be an important planning tool but
they are often poorly conceived and thus generate little
knowledge that is useful to planners.
Nine evaluation reports of housing development projects,
including slum upgrading, sites and services, and direct
construction in various developing countries are discussed.
The reports are divided into 4 general types of evaluation
depending on design and modes of data collection and
analysis.
The usual dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative
methods misstates the problem of methodological choice.
Instead it is suggested that there are two research paradigms
each of which has a different emphasis on quantitative and
qualitative methods. Based on these paradigms there are two
evaluation approaches. These approaches are termed cost-
effectiveness evaluation and illuminative evaluation.
The author's field research of low income housing
projects in Nairobi, Kenya in 1987 serves as a case study of
her contention that effective evaluation is more than a
methodological choice. The paper argues that a proper
understanding of the socio-political context, in which
projects are developed and implemented, is of overriding
importance if useful knowledge is to be generated.
Finally, the paper discusses the choice of evaluator and
the link between the institutional affiliation of the
evaluator and the evaluation approach adopted.
Thesis Supervisor: Bishwapriya Sanyal
Associate Professor
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, I attended a lecture on techniques for
monitoring and evaluation of development projects. In summing
up the discussion the lecturer, a very experienced and
insightful professional, recommended that evaluation should
be kept at a minimum. He argued, that evaluation had, since
its widespread adoption in development assistance in the mid-
seventies, generated large volumes of paper and computer-
tapes with data. Sometimes the data had been generated in an
unusable form, and most of the time the data had remained
unused, regardless of the way it had been presented. On the
whole, enormous sums of money had been wasted on evaluation,
and thus it should be kept at a minimum.
While the lecturer's critique of evaluation is
insightful - and there is a fairly widespread skepticism
about the value of evaluation - I believe it is wrong to
conclude that evaluation should be kept at a minimum. I
consider evaluation the only effective way in which we can
systematically learn from our experience with development
projects and, in particular, the only way the knowledge
generated can potentially enter into the realm of public
discourse. Evaluation can thus prevent us from having to
"reinvent the wheel" every time we begin a project. I
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believe, it is a question of how, rather than if, development
projects should be evaluated. In this paper I discuss this
question, both empirically and theoretically, with reference
to housing projects in developing countries.
In Chapter 1 I review nine evaluation reports of housing
projects including slum upgrading, sites and services, and
direct construction projects. The nine reports are divided
into four general types of evaluation according to their
design and modes of data collection and analysis.
Chapter 2 discusses problems and advantages of the
designs used in four of the evaluations as examples of the
general types of evaluation. A discussion follows, in which I
argue that the usual dichotomy between quantitative and
qualitative methods misstates the problem of methodological
choice. Instead I suggest the existence of two different
research paradigms, each with a different emphasis on and
usage of quantitative and qualitative methods. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of two distinct approaches to
what an evaluation is, for which I have adopted the terms
cost-effectiveness evaluation and illuminative evaluation.1
The nine evaluations initially reviewed are then used as
examples of the two approaches.
Effective evaluation is, however, more than a
methodological issue. In Chapter 3 I discuss why I believe
1. I have adopted and adapted these terms from Howard
Richards' discussion of evaluation in Richards, 1985.
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that a proper understanding of the socio-political context of
low income housing projects is of overriding importance in
evaluation research. Here I rely on the low income housing
experience from Nairobi, Kenya as the empirical base for the
discussion. Much of this material is based on my stay in
Kenya during the winter of 1986-87.
In the last chapter, Chapter 4, I discuss the choice of
evaluator, and the link between the institutional affiliation
of the evaluator and the evaluation approach adopted. I argue
that many of the shortcomings of evaluation are tied to
institutional constraints. The different agendas and
pressures on donors and recipients often stand in the way of
effective evaluation.
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CHAPTER 1
THE STATE OF THE ART: A REVIEW OF HOUSING EVALUATION REPORTS.
As a starting point for my discussion of evaluation
methodology I shall review a sample of evaluation reports.
All the reports reviewed cover evaluations of one or more
low-income housing projects in a Third World country. The
housing projects fall in three groups: direct construction;
site and services including construction of core-houses; and
upgrading projects. The projects differ in the provision of
public utilities, community facilities and services, and
credit. The projects are similar in that they are all fully
or partly funded by external donors. The evaluations
represent 8 countries and 5 multi- and bilateral donor
agencies.
The design of the sample does not fall under any of the
usual definitions of sample design. Random, quota, purposive,
and other sampling procedures all presuppose that somehow
there is equal access to the elements of a population from
which one tries to construct a sample. Getting access to
evaluation reports is, however, a problem. I have
discovered that in many cases donor agencies consider
evaluation reports 'classified material'; they are rarely
8
published and seldom available to the public upon request.
2
For this reason I have only been able to construct a sizeable
sample by adding reports obtained through 'the network' to
those available through libraries.'
It is alarming that donor agencies - and perhaps
governments' - try to monopolize the knowledge generated
through evaluations or at least keep it out of the hands of
the general public. On the other hand, the fact that agencies
do try to reserve this information tells us something
important for the following discussion of evaluation
methodology. First, it seems obvious that both donor agencies
and governments in general are very sensitive to exposure and
to admitting failure.' Second, one could expect publicly
available reports to be biased in favor of the involved
2. USAID evaluation reports constitute an exception. All
USAID evaluation reports are considered public domain
and are for sale on a per page fee. This is very
significant in the light of the restrictions other
agencies place on evaluation reports.
This explains why the name of the donor agency, the
city and the country has been changed in one of the evaluations.
The donor agencies often use their counterparts, i.e.
recipient governments, to explain why an evaluation
report cannot be 'released'. They have agreed, they
say, with the governments that evaluation reports are
only for internal use within the donor and government
agencies, respectively.
Certainly, the monopolizing of information would not
be caused by a desire to hide success.
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government and donor agencies.' I shall come back to these
two questions later in my discussion.
Despite the difficulties I encountered in getting access
to evaluation studies of housing projects, my sample
represents a broad range of methodologies used in evaluating
housing projects. Even if I cannot claim randomness or
representativeness, judging from my general knowledge about
evaluation methodology, a discussion of my sample of
evaluation reports will reflect the state of the art in
evaluation methodology for housing projects.'
The projects
Each evaluation report covers one or more low income
housing projects including direct construction, sites and
services and upgrading projects. Implementation of the first
and the last project started in 1974 and 1985, respectively,
and some of the projects in the sample are currently still in
the implementation phase. Figure 1.1 lists the main
characteristics of the projects.
The evaluations
One way of representing and comparing the evaluations is
4. There are other reasons why this would be the case even
if the report was not publicly available. An analogy
from the business world will illustrate this point: if
you are in business you must be careful not to insult
your customer - or you may never do business again.
~. One type of evaluation not represented in my sample is
participatory evaluation, which is widely used by for
example Oxfam America and other agencies. See Appendix
I for a discussion of the advantages and problems of
participatory evaluation.
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to provide a general list of housing project aspects to see
which of these aspects are covered in each of the
evaluations. Figure 1.2 is a matrix listing evaluations and
aspects covered.
While there are some differences in the components
covered - notably concerning project impact in general and
project impact on project participants and community
development in particular - many of the evaluations cover
similar aspects of the projects. On the other hand, the
evaluations are strikingly similar in their almost unanimous
exclusion of gender issues and issues relating to the socio-
political context of low income housing. Possible reasons for
leaving these issues out and the consequences of excluding
them shall be dealt with in greater detail in a later
chapter.
The initial similarity, however, concerning the aspects
of the projects covered, is not matched by a similarity in
data collection or in evaluation design.
Data Collection
The evaluation studies represent a host of sources for
collection of data: interviews, questionnaires, participant-
observations, documents and records, government statistics,
and physical evidence from site visits. The data collection
methods roughly fall into three broad categories: some
evaluators rely on review of documents and records and
interviews with project management for their data; some
11
evaluators add socio-economic surveys of project
participants; and some move into the communities they are
evaluating to collect data through long-term interaction with
project participants and through experiencing what it is like
to live in the project, also known as participant-observer
evaluation. Figure 1.3 lists the data collection sources used
in the reviewed evaluations.
All evaluation studies include quantitative and
qualitative data, and there is a clear tendency to include
more qualitative data the bigger the emphasis on collecting
data from project participants. Notably, none of the
evaluations prepared for USAID used project participants as a
source for data collection. This appears to be characteristic
of a majority of USAID housing evaluations."
8. To test the significance of this observation I
conducted a quick survey of a large number of annotated
bibliographies of USAID evaluations of housing
projects. Thirty annotations specifically stated data
collection methods used in the evaluation. Out of the
thirty evaluations eight - or slightly over 25% - had
used interviews with project participants as a source
for data collection.
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HOUSING PROJECT PROFILE MATRIX
- characteristics of evaluated projects -
PROJECT y
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*DONOR
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- actual/current
*UPGRADING
- # dwellings
- target
- actual/current
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HOUSING PROJECT EVALUATION MATRIX
- project aspects evaluated -
PROJECT
<
> '
ASPECT
*HOUSING PROBLEM X X X X X X
AND POLICIES
*PROJECT EVOLUTION X X X X X X X
*PROJECT OBJECTIVES X X X X X X X X
*PROJECT CONTEXT
- socio-economic X X X X X X
- nolitico-bureaucratic X X X X X
*LAND ACQUISITION X X
*CHARACTERISTICS OF X X X X X
BENEFICIARIES
*PROJECT OUTPUTS:
- physical:
- design and std's X X X X X X X X X
- house constr. X X X X X X X X X
- infrastructure X X X X X X X X
- community/com- X X NA NA NA X X NA
mercial facil's
- bldg. materials X X X X X X X X
- community dev't: NA
- plot allocation/ X X X X X
resettlement
- modes of selfhelp X X X X X X
- income/employment X X X X X X
programs
- comm. activities X X X X X
- public services X X X X X X
- technical ass. X X X X X X X X X
- fiscal/economic:
- cost of infrastr. X X X X X X
and facilities
- cost/house const. X X X X X X X X
- credit programs X X X X X X X
- cost recovery X X X X X NA X X
- legal:
- tenure/ownership X X X
- eviction/demol. X
(--continued next page--)
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HOUSING PROJECT EVALUATION MATRIX
(--continued--)
PROJECT q
ASPECT _
- institutional:
- inst. dev't X X X X
- staffing/mgt. X X X X X X X
- inter-agency X X X
collaboration
*PROJECT IMPACT NA
- project participants: a)
- targeting and X X X X X X
affordability
- hous. cost/qual. X X X X X X X
- access: services X X X X X X
and facilities
- income generation X X X X X X
- comm. dev't. X X X X
- part.satisfaction X X X X X
- gender aspects X X X X
- housing:
- housing stock X
- housing policies X X X X
and standards
- city/area:
- political impact X X X
- social impact X X X
- local finance X
a) project delay made it impossible to evaluate impact.
Figure 1.2: Housing project evaluation matrix.
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EVALUATION DATA COLLECTION MATRIX
- data collection sources used -
PROJECT
SOURCE
*DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS X X X X
*PHYSICAL EVIDENCE X X X X
(site visits)
*QUESTIONNAIRES
- project management
- project participants X X X X
*INTERVIEWS
- housing officials X X X X
(government, donor,
and other)
- project management X X X X
- project participants X X
*PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION X X
a) no source indicated
Figure 1.3: Data collection
XI
X X
x
X
a)
a)
X
X
X
a)
X
X
X
X
X
sources.
Design
The designs used in the 9 evaluation studies represent
roughly four general types of evaluation designs: goals
evaluation, impact evaluation, self evaluation and
participant-observer evaluation. I shall briefly describe
each type.
Goals evaluation is primarily concerned with measuring
whether actual output matches the intended output of a
project and whether the outputs were produced efficiently.
Goals evaluation uses physical development and management
performance as indicators of achievement of goals and
efficiency in implementation.
16
X
X
X
X
X
Impact evaluation tries, as the name implies, to assess
the socio-economic impact of the project. Impact evaluation
uses experimental and quasi-experimental designs to measure
longitudinal impact of the project on project participants.
Cost-benefit analysis or other methods for assessing cost-
effectiveness are applied to measure the economic impact of
the project.
Self evaluation does not prescribe the use of any
particular methods for data collection. Through interaction
between the evaluator and project management it is
established which issues are of importance for the success or
failure of the project and its components. The evaluation
seeks to document and organize project experiences and
lessons.
The aim of participant-observer evaluation is similar to
that of self evaluation, but it documents and organizes
project experiences and lessons through immersion in the
project as a participant. The evaluator moves into the
project for an extended period of time and tries to learn
about reasons for project success or failure from viewpoint
of the project participants.
The four types of evaluation merely represent a rough
typology, and variation within each type and overlaps between
them may indeed occur. On the other hand, I believe it is
entirely possible to describe the nine studies I have
reviewed in accordance with this typology. Figure 1.4 lists
17
the four evaluation designs and how they apply to the nine
studies.
EVALUATION DESIGN MATRIX
- evaluation designs used -
PROJECT
1.4 a 0
DESIGN
*GOALS EVALUATION X X X X
*IMPACT EVALUATION X X
*SELF EVALUATION X
*PARTICIPANT-OBSERVER X X
EVALUATION
Figure 1.4: Evaluation designs.
In the following chapter I shall discuss the four
evaluation designs, including data collection and analysis
methods applied as strategies for evaluation of social action
programs, such as housing projects in developing countries.
It should be added, that although I have identified four
evaluation design types, if the evaluations are viewed
according to their general purpose, the evaluations can be
reduced to two general approaches, viz. cost-effectiveness
evaluation and illuminative evaluation. This discussion will
be fully developed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In the previous chapter nine evaluations of housing
projects in developing countries were briefly reviewed
concerning aspects of projects evaluated, data collection
sources used and evaluation designs used. Four general
evaluation designs were identified among the reviewed
evaluations. This chapter continues the discussion of the
evaluation designs. Four of the evaluations - serving as
illustrations of the four design types - will be discussed in
greater detail. The evaluations will be discussed in more or
less detail, according to their methodological scope and
relative importance as examples of evaluation research.
A theoretical discussion will follow the discussion of
evaluation design, addressing the application of different
research paradigms to the evaluation of social action
programs, i.e. low income housing projects in developing
countries.
The last section of this chapter examines and compares
the nine evaluation studies from the perspective of the
general purpose of project evaluation.
Evaluation Designs: A Critique.
Goals evaluation: the case of Gaborone West I and Francistown
IV in Botswana.
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The field work for the evaluation of two USAID-financed
housing projects - a site and services project and an
upgrading project - was carried out in a 3-week period in
1988. The clients for the evaluation were the Ministry of
Local Government and Lands in Botswana and USAID.
The evaluation design is characterized by 1) an emphasis
on quantitative data and non-rigorous treatment of
qualitative data; 2) a near total exclusion of data on or
obtained from project participants; and 3) its selective
focus on achievement of physical development and of
management and training objectives.
The evaluation relies heavily on quantitative
interpretations of the degree to which project objectives
were achieved. Most project components are evaluated in terms
of number of units planned vs. actual output, i.e. success is
measured in quantities. A case in point is the building
materials loan program:
It is felt that the Building Materials Loan Program has
worked well in Gaborone West I. More than 64% of the
SHHA residents have received loans.9 (emphasis added)
Qualitative aspects of the projects are covered under a
rubric called "Comments". What is interesting about the
qualitative interpretations is that the majority of them are
unsubstantiated. It is as if the evaluators apply two
different standards of rigor to the two types of data. A
20
USAID, 1988:12. SHHA stands for Self Help Housing
Agency.
clear example is provided in the discussion of Gaborone Self
Help Housing Agency:
The main problem appears to be with collections. The
ward office community development workers are required
to visit residents and encourage payment of the levy and
BML loans. Since they have no authority to impose
sanctions, and probably little training in this area, it
is not very effective. In addition, the workers
encounter hostility from the residents who do not want
to be reminded that they are behind in payments. Since
an unpleasant task produces little benefit, it is not
surprising that the staff is discouraged. It is also
likely that the negative feelings on the part of
beneficiaries adversely affects the other education and
community development activities of the department.10
(emphasis added)
It is not within the realm of my research to explain
exactly why different standards appear to exist for
quantitative and qualitative interpretations of the project -
but I shall suggest a couple of possible explanations.
One explanation could lie in standard USAID guidelines
for evaluation, which require only quantitative information
and, in turn, led the evaluators only to collect quantitative
data. Realizing the project could not be interpreted only
through quantitative data, and not appreciating - or
understanding - how to produce rigorous qualitative data, the
evaluators chose the format of 'comments'.
Another explanation has to do with the politics of
evaluation. The 'comments' may be a way of providing an
'insider', i.e. relevant USAID staff, with information
without offending or exposing anybody. This would explain the
ibid., 1988:22.
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very vague terms used to describe some of the project's
problems."
Needless to say, a narrow technical-administrative focus
for the evaluation and a near total exclusion of data on
and/or obtained from project participants biases the
evaluation.12
It becomes an evaluation of certain, predetermined
aspects of a project rather than of the project as a whole.
If, as is often the case, the outcome of a project is related
to social or political circumstances - as I shall discuss in
a later section of this paper - an evaluation after this
model will be of little use for future policy making and
project design.
Impact evaluation: the case of the First El Salvador Sites
and Services Project.
The field work for the El Salvador project evaluation
was carried out in a five-year period from 1975-80. The
clients for the evaluation were the executing agency, the
. This argument is supported by the general nature of
many USAID evaluation reports. Criticism of projects is
usually subdued - one gets the general notion that
USAID projects are always very successful - and
criticism of host governments is practically non-existent.
12. Ironically, the following comment in the evaluation
report points out that such data is necessary in
'proper evaluation': "Development standards for
residential areas should be based on the needs as
well as the financial capacity of the target
population.... but, with proper evaluation, this
will be understood before accepting the standards.
(emphasis added) Such data was, however, not
collected by the Botswana evaluation team. Source:
USAID, 1988:21.
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Salvadoran Foundation for Low Cost Housing (FSDVM), and the
World Bank.
The evaluation of the First El Salvador Sites and
Services Project included short-term evaluation studies,
designed to provide immediate feedback to project management;
medium-range evaluation of project components designed to
modify plans for later phases of the project still in the
planning stage; and long-range impact and policy studies,
designed to evaluate overall project impact and provide input
for future shelter policies for the implementing agency and
national planning agencies in El Salvador. 3
The evaluation's main focus was on long-term impacts and
the achievement of project objectives. A detailed analysis of
the design of the long-range studies will follow. Some
general comments related to the short- and medium-range
studies will conclude the section.
The long-range studies included longitudinal impact
studies, a cost-benefit comparison of low-income housing
options, project benefit evaluation through hedonic price
analysis and an evaluation of project impact through
comparisons of changes in value of the house.
Longitudinal impact studies.
A quasi-experimental design was used to evaluate the
Bamberger, 1982a:238. It should be added, although it
is not stated in the evaluation report, that the
evaluation study has potential value to the Bank as
input to its policy making process.
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impact of the project on the socio-economic conditions of the
project participants. The choice of a quasi-experimental
design proved to entail a number of difficulties for the
impact evaluation. The experimental sample was formed by the
196 families selected for the project, but who had not yet
moved there. A stratified control sample was constructed from
three main types of low-cost housing in the city.1 4
The construction of the control sample was a major
practical and methodological obstacle. Maps had to be drawn
of 67 communities to construct a sampling frame for the
drawing of a random sample. The sample of the mesones was
affected by methodological bias1" and the sample of the
colonias ilegales potentially had an even larger bias1 *.
Furthermore, major theoretical problems arose from using a
14. There are three types of low-cost housing in Santa Ana:
"mesones" (tenement houses), "colonias ilegales"
(extra-legal subdivisions), and "tugurios" (illegal
squatter settlements).
13. Since Santa Ana has 1000 mesones the task of
constructing a sampling frame by drawing up maps
for all the mesones was too big and a sample of 50
mesones out of the 1000 was drawn at random. The
'random sample' drawn from the [501 mesones is
"...technically a cluster sample but as both the
total number of mesones and the number of mesones
in the sample, were quite large, it is argued that
for operational purposes the sample can be
considered to approximate a simple random sample."
Bamberger et al., 1982a:255.
16. All of Santa Ana's 30 colonias ilegales "[..] were
visited, classified over a series of indicators,
and then ranked and classified into two groups,
poorer and richer. A sample of five colonias was
selected in each group. ibid.
24
non-equivalent control group, because of significant initial
differences between the project participants and the control
group. Even if differences were found between "...the income
of the two groups in T(3) we cannot immediately infer that
the difference is due to project impact."1 7
To compensate for this situation multiple regression
analysis was used. Regression results for income were
computed on family earnings, earnings of head of household,
and earnings of secondary workers to support the analysis of
the project's impact on income.
Ironically, it seems that the laborious and
statistically advanced techniques used in the impact
evaluation of the project concerning income did not produce
much 'hard evidence' of the actual economic impact, as
measured in income changes for the participants, as the
summary of findings from the evaluation report reveals:
Our results indicate that the participants may have
experienced a slightly greater increase in earnings than
the non-participants and that the less well off they
were, the better they performed with respect to earnings
per worker. Whether one considers this a project impact
is a moot point as earnings are a function of a variety
of things and their connection with housing is by no
means direct, nor is it a strong one. However, there
seems to be some evidence of motivation at work among
the participating households as indicated by a relative
stability in the employment patterns among their
secondary workers. (emphasis added)1 "
In other words, aside from the methodological problems
17. ibid., 1982a:257.
". ibid., 1982a:270.
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that arose from choosing a quasi-experimental design, the
choice of a quantitative method left the evaluators without
much information. Quantitative methods are - as I shall
discuss in more detail in the following chapter - largely
"knowledge verifying". The knowledge about the relation
between housing and income in developing countries is,
however, rather incomplete, as the evaluators admit. Even if
the design of the quasi-experiment had proved successful, it
would not be possible to relate the different aspects of the
project to potential changes in income.
Cost-benefit comparison of low income housing options.
A cost-benefit comparison was made of eight housing
options accessible to the low-income population of San
Salvador. The information on cost was obtained from the
organization or the family responsible for construction.
Information on benefits was estimated by asking families how
much they thought they could earn from renting their house
("imputed rent"). To generalize these findings conversion
factors were used to calculate cost and benefits to the
nation, and flows were estimated over both 20 and 30 year
time horizons. The resulting cost-benefit ratios were used
for efficiency analysis, social analysis and private
analysis. Different assumptions about the land values and
consumer surplus were included in the calculations.
Aside from the usual criticism of cost-benefit
26
analysis1 ' a number of other factors affect this particular
design. Firstly, imputed rent - derived from interviewing
families about how much they thought they could earn in rent
- may be a highly unreliable figure, especially over time.
The size of the rent is influenced by how many families
decide to rent, the proximity of the project to work-places
and public facilities, the maintenance of the project, the
implementation of other low-income housing projects in the
city, the economy in general, etc. It is questionable whether
families have access to this information and are able to
estimate the imputed rent. Secondly, projections of cost and
benefits over 20 and 30 year time horizons seem highly
unreliable in light of the typically unstable Third World
context.
Hedonic price analysis.
Hedonic price analysis was used to eliminate the effects
of government regulation and thus obtain a 'free market'
picture of project impact on housing.
Using hedonic price analysis for evaluating project
impact is, according to the evaluators, considered somewhat
problematic. As stated in the report:
Care must be taken in the interpretation of the results
as the estimates only refer to imputed rent and do not
include the value of owning as opposed to renting. One
way to interpret the hedonic estimation of rent is to
assume that this indicates the amount the family would
have been prepared to pay to receive this package of
. For a critique of cost benefit analysis see, for
example, Skaburskis, 1987; Tolchin, 1987.
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benefits. If the imputed rent is compared with the
amount the family actually has to pay to the
[implementing agency], the difference can be interpreted
as indicating additional benefits the occupant obtains
"for free".20
In other words, the hedonic price analysis is based on a
number of more or less controversial interpretations of the
calculations used in the analysis. This may seriously
challenge the result of the analysis. Furthermore, one can
question the actual value of a hedonic price analysis that
eliminates the effect of government regulation of the housing
market. It is rather unlikely that a free market situation
will ever exist, and it is significant to World Bank sites
and services projects that restrictions on selling and
renting apply.
Comparisons of changes in value of the house.
As an alternative method for evaluating project impact
on housing value, estimates of changes in housing value were
derived and compared with changes in cost. Again, the
conclusions made on the basis of the calculations are not
conclusive, in fact, the evaluators concluded that they could
only, "make some tentative judgement as to which type of
housing produces the highest benefits for occupants."2 1
Conclusion on long-range impact and policy studies.
The methodologies used for the long-range impact and
policy studies of the First Sites and Services Project in El
20. Bamberger et al., 1982a:273-4.
21. ibid.:277.
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Salvador were all based upon the evaluators's ability to
generate rigorous and reliable data as input for the rather
laborious and complicated calculations used to reach
conclusions about project income - data that often does not
exist in developing countries and which is hard to develop.
The quasi-experimental design also proved infeasible - not an
uncommon situation in a Third World context. The shortcomings
of the experimental design is highlighted by the following
passage from the evaluation of the World Bank project in
Zambia:
To conduct a rigorous impact evaluation it is necessary
to have a control group against which to gauge the
significance of the changes observed in the project
areas. [But] The control group originally included in
the research design was dispersed due to
flooding,....Further difficulties were caused by
problems of matching families who moved to overspill
areas with the same families interviewed in the
upgrading areas before they moved. In the process of
moving, many families went to unnumbered plots which
made it very difficult to match the families.2 2
Aside from practical problems with design and data-
collection, the particular context of the evaluation also
proved unsuited for the use of quantitative, primarily
"knowledge-verifying", techniques. These techniques - adopted
from natural science research - can in reality only
invalidate a theory about a causal relationship.2 3 They
22. Bamberger et al., 1982b:43-44.
2 Hudson (1975) writes: science can never prove
anything, but only disprove ideas that are false. This
is in fact a basic intention of a scientific
proposition - that it can be demonstrated false if it
is false - in contrast to religious or moral or
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cannot prove anything nor can they provide any explanation as
to the reasons for causality or lack thereof. As the
longitudinal impact study of income showed, if little is
known about causal relationships the results of a complicated
quantitative analysis may prove of little use.
Short and medium range studies.
This section is devoted to some general comments on the
methodologies used for data collection for short- and medium-
range studies.
The short-range studies were concerned with estimating
the potential demand for the type of housing to be
implemented as the First El Salvador Sites and Services
Project and evaluating the reasons for families to drop out
of the project once implemented. The medium-range studies
evaluated different project components, i.e. the cooperative
program, the mutual help program, the housing consolidation
process, the participant selection process and the economics
of self-help housing.
A variety of different data-collection methods were used
in the evaluations: case studies, semi-structured interviews,
questionnaire surveys, participant observations, review of
project records and of data on social, economic and political
factors affecting certain components of the project.
aesthetic or other nonscientific contentions. (It is
not possible to prove that God doesn't exist, or that
Head Start was a failure. All that science can "prove"
is that God and Head Start haven't granted certain
specific wishes).", p.81.
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Obtaining information from project participants on
certain economic factors of the project often prove
particularly difficult. Many people do not keep records of
their expenditures and cannot recall how much they have spent
if a long time has lapsed before they are interviewed.
Furthermore, some people are reluctant to give information
about their income if it differs from the income-range
defining eligibility for the project. These issues were dealt
with in the El Salvador evaluation by interviewing
participants about construction cost at three different
points in time; and by a series of consistency checks of the
information such as comparing income with expenditure or with
typical wage rates. If inconsistencies were found a return
visit was made. These methods improved the reliability of the
data collected for the evaluation.
In general, obtaining information from people in
developing countries by means of surveys is encumbered with
difficulty if such information is perceived as controversial
like a survey of family income. Even if the income-range
requirements only count at the time of application, a family
may still be fearful of providing the correct information, if
indeed they gave incorrect information on the application
form - a common occurrence in many projects. An example of
the difficulty involved in getting controversial information
from surveys is provided by Thorner and Thorner in their
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analysis of the notorious All-India Credit Survey24
There are fields in which the errors of response may be
expected to be very large as, say, in connection with
sensitive subjects on which questions may be resented,
e.g., bootlegging, selling opium, sex relations,
gambling, tax evasion, etc. ... [Also] debt is a painful
subject, not likely to be discussed easily or candidly
with anyone, let alone casual strangers carrying
formidable questionnaires. ... To the peasant, the
moneylender is likely to be "at once a necessity and a
terror." The peasant might like to curse him, but may
find it wiser to keep mum.2
Evaluation of project context.
As described the evaluation primarily emphasized the use
of quantitative data and scientific2" methods, although in
some instances efforts were made to include qualitative
information provided either by project participants or from
data on social, economic and political factors.
Significantly, however, no attempt was made to include the
effects of the 1979 coup in El Salvador and the following
period of unrest in that country in the evaluation, although
the evaluation report states "...they obviously have had
extremely negative effects in the area of housing." 27 In the
report it is argued that most of the evaluation was over some
months before the coup. The report, however, was not
24. The All-India Credit Survey is a 'text-book case' of
how not to design, conduct, interpret and use surveys.
25 sThorner and Thorner, 1962:205.
26. The word 'scientific' is here and in the remainder
of the paper used to describe that which originates
from natural science as opposed to that which is
systematic and exact.
27. Bamberger et al., 1982a:2.
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published until almost 3 years later. While the occurrence of
political coups and periods of unrest is not an uncommon
phenomena in many Third World countries2", it is interesting
that no attempt was made to provide even a rudimentary
analysis of the coup's impact on the project.
Self evaluation: the case of the Southern Africa Upgrading
Project.
The field work for the evaluation was carried out during
a three week period in 1985. The immediate clients for the
evaluation are the funding and implementing agencies - a non-
American bilateral donor agency and the local municipal
council, respectively. The evaluator, however, refers to
"..those locally involved in upgrading.." as the ultimate
judges of the relevance and utility of the evaluation study.
The evaluation design is characterized by presenting a
series of issues, gathered from the families and
professionals involved in the project, rather than being an
in-depth, item-by-item evaluation. It is furthermore focused
on a self-evaluation approach, i.e. only issues that arose
during discussions and were pointed out to be more critical
were included in the evaluation.
Methods used for data collection include review of
reports and documents; field visits to areas not upgraded and
previous upgrading projects; discussions with housing
28. Bolivia, for example, experienced 189 coups during the
first 155 years of independence (1825 - 1980) -
averaging a coup every 10 months. Source: Information
Please Almanac, 1983:155.
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officials and project staff members; and a brief survey of
families in selected sections of the project. The data
collected is organized in four sections concerning: 1) issues
for project formulation; 2) issues for project
implementation; 3) issues for project administration; and 4)
issues for project future.
The significance of this evaluation is the lack of a
preconceived design for the inquiry and the reliance on
project participants and professionals to define the issues
of the evaluation.
A genuine attempt is made to include the participants'
view, although the evaluation seems to value input from
project participants less than from professionals2 ". The
questionnaire used to survey families in the project was
administered by local trainees attached to the project; and
[t]he trainees were chosen since the assumption was made
that families may be more open to their questions. The
community development workers were not used since it was
felt that they would be perceived as representing the
City Council and responses may be inhibited."
The questionnaire, however, appears to produce bias
against women in the project. One question, for example, asks
"What is the employment of the father (household head)?" 3'
and in the summary of the sample survey it is stated, that
29. A relatively short questionnaire with few open-ended
questions was given to a sample of families.
30 Southern Africa Evaluation Report, 1985:58.
31 ibid., 1985:60.
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[aicceptable respondents [to the survey] were the
husband as first choice, and the wife as default.3 2
Another example of bias against women as bread winners
is found in the discussion of economic promotion. The primary
targets for employment training programs are defined as
'housewives' and teenagers, but the report states that:
..it was interesting to note that during the period of
review, the attendance of classes for housewives was
very poor, explained in part that the housewives did not
want to miss a sale of their vegetables on the
roadside.3
It is obvious here, that these women are engaged in
earning an income and thus are wrongly viewed as housewives.
In theory, using a self-evaluation approach where
parties affected by the project ('stakeholders') define the
issues to be included, should produce highly relevant
information. Project participants and professionals have
daily experience with the project, its problems and
accomplishments. Self evaluation may, however, also produce
biases. Firstly, self evaluation is likely to produce bias,
if a person or group has a stake in the issues identified for
evaluation. This is, for example, often the case when
organizations evaluate projects at the end of a funding cycle
to make decisions concerning future funding.3 4 Secondly, as
insiders, project participants and professionals are less
32. ibid.:58.
3 . ibid.:23.
Interview with Joel Charny, Oxfam America. October 28,
1989.
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likely to see the project in a larger context and may
concentrate only on issues directly related to the project in
isolation. Such bias is of course far more likely in cases of
'complete' self evaluation, i.e. where no outsiders to the
project are involved in identifying issues and collecting and
analyzing data.
I have no way of assessing the specific relevance of the
issues included in the Southern Africa evaluation. From my
general experience with similar projects the evaluation does,
however, touch on many critical issues in what appears to be
a balanced way - at least regarding major aspects of the
upgrading project as they are described in the beginning of
the report. On the other hand, the evaluation shows
significant bias against women as breadwinners. It is assumed
that women are not heads of households, an assumption which
one might question based on data from other low income
housing projects in Africa.3 But, even if no such data
existed it is up to the evaluator to prove that women are, in
fact, never the only or principal breadwinners of a
household, rather than assuming that they are not.
Participant-observer evaluation: the case of Guayaquil and
La Paz.
As an experiment with qualitative evaluation methodology
the World Bank arranged in 1982 for a consultant to live in
two different housing project communities in Guayaquil,
"". See for example Nimpuno, 1986 and Obudho and Mblanga,
1988:209.
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Ecuador and La Paz, Bolivia for about five months in each:
Arrangements were made with two project agencies in
Ecuador and Bolivia for me to live in project
communities for varying periods, to participate in local
activities, and to develop new approaches and
methodologies for improving communication between the
participants and those sharing responsibility for the
projects.3*
The primary clients for the evaluations were the World
Bank and the managers of the two projects. The evaluation
methodology used by the consultant - labelled 'participant-
observer evaluation'3 7 - is based primarily on qualitative
interviews with samples of project participants, and on
informal talk and other types of interaction in the project
areas."8 The findings from the qualitative interviews are -
whenever possible - supported by quantitative interpretations
of the information given by the project participants.
The World Bank initiated this experiment with
participant-observer evaluation out of dissatisfaction with
the ability of traditional sample surveys and discussion with
36 Salmen, 1987:5.
37. Observation is by some authors defined as a means
of collecting information without asking anybody
anything - also referred to as 'unobtrusive
measures; see for example Weiss, 1972:54. Other
authors, e.g. Guba and Lincoln, prefer a broader
definition, defining the participant observer as
"a genuine participant; that is, he is a member of
the group, and he has a stake in the group s
activity and the outcomes of that activity." Guba
and Lincoln, 1981:190.
38 In one case interviews were carried out with residents
in a slum area, originally chosen for a World Bank
upgrading project, about which it later had been
decided that no project were to be implemented.
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community representatives to produce relevant and -
paradoxically3 ' - reliable information about participants's
views. Two questions were of particular interest to the Bank:
The question was, first, whether incorporating the point
of view of project beneficiaries into management
decisionmaking in this way was useful and cost-
effective. If it proved successful, then the question
was whether professionals in developing countries would
be willing and able to cross class and income lines so
as to interpret the perspective of project beneficiaries
of their own society and provide useful feedback to
host-country and Bank managers."
The primary objective of the evaluation - and of
participant-observer evaluation generally - was to provide
"...project managers with useful and timely information to
help them make decisions that [would] improve the project's
performance."*" A secondary objective was to facilitate
people's participation in policy-making; and a final
objective was to generate knowledge about development
projects - participant-observer evaluation should serve as a
preliminary tool for "more rigorous research", i.e. the use
of knowledge-verifying methods such as advanced quantitative
analyses. An important aspect of this approach is its attempt
to avoid the usual dichotomy made in evaluations between
* Quantitative methods are traditionally advocated
because of their ability to produce objective, i.e.
reliable information.
. Salmen, 1987:7.
41. ibid.:108.
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process and impact evaluation.4 2
The consultant lived in La Paz and in Guayaquil for two
periods in each place, separated by an interval of about
seven months. During this period he carried out a total of 5
formal surveys of samples of the project participants in La
Paz and 6 formal surveys in Guayaquil. The different methods
include socio-economic surveys using a closed questionnaire;
questionnaire-like interview forms using a mix of closed and
open questions; and unstructured qualitative interviews using
open questions.
A few examples of the findings from the participant-
observer evaluations shall be provided here:
- In one of the projects the community leaders, although
well-intentioned, were all property owners from higher
income groups and did not represent the interests of the
poorer renters.
- In the unstable economic and political contexts of these
two cities, property ownership offered one of the few
opportunities to achieve a sense of personal security.
Consequently, an extremely high value was placed on
ownership.
- Living in one of the newly designed houses revealed many
of its design shortcomings (lack of ventilation, poor
drainage, high noise level from neighbors) in a way
which was never appreciated from casual visits. 3
The method of participant-observer evaluation proved very
42. Process evaluation is usually known as monitoring.
See for example Bamberger and Hewitt, 1986:7.
43. ibid.:153-54
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successful both in the eyes of the Bank"* and most of the
project managers*5 - some of whom initially had expressed
doubts or even opposition to the approach. From the
perspective of the project managers the approach brought
about information that "most likely would have been ignored
by a measurement-oriented quantitative approach."4 * And, of
particular interest to the Bank, participant-observer
evaluation proved to be reasonably fast and cheap. Indirect
savings may be realized by producing quick, reliable and
useful information to project management. Furthermore, the
evaluation methodology itself is inexpensive regarding
salaries and data processing:
The seven evaluations done by host-country personnel in
Bolivia, Brazil, and Thailand cost an average of $15,000
each, while the projects evaluated averaged $9 million
in loan amounts. Almost 50 percent of the evaluations'
cost in these first efforts was for guidance by World
Bank personnel - a cost that will diminish appreciably
over time as local institutions gain the expertise to
conduct this kind of work on their own.*4
4*. For some reservations about the participant-
observer method on the World Bank's part see,
ibid.:154-55.
. A few project managers disapproved of the approach,
according to the consultant, because they were
concerned "...that the information produced might be
used to undermine their own authority or jeopardize the
program for which they were responsible." Salmen,
1987:101.
4* ibid., 1987:127.
. ibid.:128. These projects represent the 'second
generation' of participant-observer evaluations carried
out by the World Bank.
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Also the attempt to find host-country nationals with
both the commitment to and the skill for conducting
participant-observer evaluation proved to be relatively easy.
According to the consultant, however, some shortcomings
in participant-observer evaluation do exist. Inexperience of
practitioners and supervisors can lead to inadequate analysis
and substantiation. In some cases this had led to findings
being presented to management as raw data without any
analysis. Also, the incomplete understanding by project
managers of the difficulty of the execution of the evaluation
and the value of the findings affected the success of the
evaluation.
Salmen underlines the importance of experience and
mature judgments in choosing participant-observer evaluators.
There are, however, other potential short-comings in the
participant-observer approach that are related to this and
other aspects of the methodology.
Possibly, the most controversial aspect of participant-
observer evaluation is the difficulty in identifying and
controlling for observation bias. Use of triangulation** -
ensuring reliability by means of cross-checking findings -
can limit such bias, if it is inadvertent. But, bias caused
48. Lawrence Salmen lists 4 different means of
triangulation: using various sources of
information, using different researchers,
approaching the issue from the perspective of
different theories, and studying a problem with
different methodologies. Salmen, 1987:120. See also
Richards, 1985:110-145.
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by co-optation of the evaluation poses a far more serious
threat to participant-observer evaluation. If the observer
has a stake in the project being evaluated, whether directly
or merely from an ideological point of view, the implicit
neutrality of the observer is threatened. In the case of the
participant-observer approach tested by the Bank, the
evaluation was closely related to the needs of management.
Consistent with serving the needs of the managers the
approach gave them control over the selection of the
evaluators and the dissemination of findings from the
evaluation. In such cases, co-optation by management leading
to hiding of embarrassing or unwelcome findings may indeed
take place. Likewise, the evaluator may be coopted by project
participants - particularly in the case of host-country
evaluators - through the offerings of bribes, etc.
If project participants perceive the evaluator as a
representative of project management or the government - both
of which they may perceive with distrust, fear or even
hostility - research may become very difficult.**
In other words, the gaining of trust - a prerequisite
A good anecdote illustrating the problem of distrust
was told to me by a person who worked on a project,
operated by an agency of the Puerto Rican government.
The project was aimed at isolated communities in Puerto
Rico during the 1960's. The agronomist assigned to one
community in the mountains of Puerto Rico to help
peasants improve tobacco and livestock production,
spent the better part of a year gaining the confidence
of the local peasants. The reason: they thought he was
actually a revenue agent sent by the government sent to
shut down their illegal stills.
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for participant observer evaluation - may entail huge
difficulties and may not be possible at all. This problem, of
course, only gets accentuated in authoritarian countries and
communities.
As an explanation of the attractiveness of participant-
observer evaluation to most managers Salmen cites the
coincidence of the approach with a political democratization
process:
Both Bolivia and Brazil were moving from authoritarian
to more open, participatory forms of government during
the execution of these evaluations. Political leaders
saw a congruence between this operational, human inquiry
and their own efforts to fashion programs responsive to
people's needs and wants."*
If, however, the opposite had been the case - as it is,
for example, in Kenya - participant-observer evaluation may
not be accepted by government officials or trusted by project
participants. This type of approach may also disrupt the
internal power-balance of a community - a situation that may
prove most unpleasant for a participant-observer, if he or
she is perceived as a threat by the local leaders. Disrupting
the power structure of a community can lead to a breakdown of
an evaluation if leaders feel threatened in their positions
of power and try to use various forms of coercion to stop
further research. This may also pose a direct threat to the
safety of the evaluator.
As a design option for evaluation in a Third World
**. Salmen, 1987:104
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context participant-observer evaluation has the ability to
take the larger political, social and cultural context into
account. It is reasonably fast and fairly cheap. It also has
the ability to overcome the shortcomings of traditional
sample surveys and quantitative impact studies, through an
in-depth qualitative understanding of causal relations.
Whether it has the ability to overcome co-optation, distrust
and the danger in potentially disrupting local power
structures is largely a question of the specific setting, and
is left at the discretion of the evaluator."
Research Paradigms Applied To Evaluation Research
The previous section discussed evaluation design and
methods used for data collection and analysis. In this
section, I argue that the discussion whether quantitative or
qualitative methods are better is a misinterpretation of the
methodological choices that have to be made to carry out
evaluation research. Rather, there is a choice to be made
concerning which research paradigm to apply to the inquiry.
"Between a rock and a soft place."5 2
It may appear that the choice of evaluation methodology
. I shall discuss the choice of evaluator in relation to
different evaluation strategies in more detail in a
later section.
52. "To corrupt a contemporary metaphor, we risk being
caught between a rock and a soft place. The rock is
rigor, and the soft place is relevance...",
Bronfenbrenner, 1977 - quoted in Guba and Lincoln,
1981:66.
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is largely a choice between quantitative and qualitative
methods - or a choice of rigor versus relevance - rather than
a choice between different research paradigms and what
follows in terms of specific methods to be applied. The World
Bank presents the choice this way:
There is a continuing discussion among evaluation
practitioners as to whether quantitative or qualitative
methods are better. The debate is often conducted in
quite heated terms as it involves philosophical and
ethical issues as well as methodology.... The approach
adopted in the present document is that all techniques
have their strengths and weaknesses and that a multi-
method approach should always be used in which
quantitative and qualitative methods are combined.5 3
That is, the World Bank presents different evaluation
methods - e.g. experimental design and ethnographic
"techniques" - merely as a set of different techniques that
each have their strengths and weaknesses.
A study of aid evaluation as practiced by member-
countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the OECD reveals a similar understanding, perceiving
different research paradigms as being complementary:
Clearly, the classical model of a scientific
experimental or quasi-experimental research design is
very rarely if ever feasible in evaluating donor-
assisted development projects. Short of this ideal,
however, donors have still failed to explore the
possibilities of empirical research. They have neglected
[these] opportunities:
a) systematic efforts to experiment with "less-than
-perfect" variants of the classical model;
b) the use of innovative research methods that do not
rely wholly on the "expertness" of the evaluation team
. Bamberger and Hewitt,1986:57.
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An elaboration of this view is provided by Richard P.
Nathan:
[Q]ualitative studies provide the understanding upon
which formal modelling can be done. Qualitative research
should be used to provide hypotheses, lists of important
variables, and tentative conclusions. Quantitative
researchers can then subject it to the falsification
criteria.5 "
Making choices about evaluation methodology is not,
however, a matter of whether quantitative methods 'are
better' than qualitative (or vice versa). Even less so is it
a discussion of combining "less-than-perfect" variants of the
scientific paradigm with innovative research methods -
combining quantitative methods with qualitative methods - to
make up for the shortcomings of the former.
Fundamental differences exist between a scientific
experimental evaluation design and, for example, an
ethnographic evaluation design; and rather than seeing them
as part of a continuum, they must be perceived as derived
from different - and in many ways antagonistic - research
paradigms. In the following they shall be referred to as the
scientific versus the naturalistic paradigm.5 "
The two paradigms represent different interpretations on
* OECD, 1986:33.
"". Nathan, 1985:719.
56. Michael Patton presents the two paradigms as 'the
hypothetico-deductive, natural science paradigm' versus
'the holistic-inductive, anthropological paradigm.
Patton, 1980:17.
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a number of basic assumptions, as stated by Guba and Lincoln:
[T]wo paradigms for dealing with "truth" have emerged as
major competitors. These are the scientific paradigm,
based on logical positivist epistemology, and the
naturalistic paradigm, based on a phenomenological
epistemology. These two paradigms differ on a number of
basic assumptions, of which three have been singled out
for attention here: the nature of reality, subject-
object dualism, and the nature of truth statements. When
an investigator begins the study of some problem...., he
should determine as well as he can which set of
assumptions best fits the phenomena to be studied.5 7
I shall briefly discuss the differences in the
assumptions about 'the nature of the truth statement'
represented by the two paradigms. This discussion is
important because it can help clarify that the choice to be
made in evaluation research is a choice between paradigms and
not between quantitative and qualitative methods - nor is it
per se a choice between rigor and relevance. The way truth is
arrived at from the perspective of the two paradigms
determines, in other words, what is termed relevant and how
tests of rigor can be met.
In the scientific paradigm truth is verified through
experimentation. The hypotheses for establishing truth are
deduced from a priori theory, and the experimental testing of
the theory will establish generalizations that are widely
applicable (non context-related). The scientific inquirer
furthermore perceives data as being uninfluenced by
interaction between inquirer and phenomenon.
This understanding of truth is contrasted by the
Guba and Lincoln, 1985:62.
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understanding contained in the naturalistic paradigm. In this
paradigm "truths" - or multiple realities - are discovered
through interaction between inquirer and the phenomena. Such
interaction will lead to conclusions about what is important,
dynamic and pervasive in that field, rather than what has
"enduring truth value" 8
Empirical evidence provided in this paper indicates
that the scientific paradigm is unsuited for inquiry in the
social-behavioral sciences for a number of reasons.
Scientific evaluation approaches depend on the ability to
generate rigorous and reliable primarily quantitative data -
data that often do not exist, especially in developing
countries, and which are hard to recreate, as proved by the
impact studies of the First El Salvador Sites and Services
Project.
The scientific evaluation design also generally fails to
take the context into account - again because of the "data
limitations and insuperable statistical problems""
experienced when trying to measure complex situations with
experimental, quantitative methods. Quantitative methods are
primarily 'knowledge-verifying' and ignore information that
cannot be quantified, regardless of its importance to project
ibid.:55.
"'. Aiken et al., 1985:467.
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processes, outcomes and impacts."
The shortcomings of scientific research methods cannot,
however, simply be "patched up" by methods based on a
naturalistic paradigm, as suggested by the methodological
discussion by the World Bank and the DAC. Instead choices
must be made as to which aspects of project evaluation lend
themselves better to which methods within the naturalistic
paradigm.
Evaluation Approaches
The previous section was devoted to a general discussion
of the different research paradigms applied to evaluation
research, namely the scientific and the naturalistic
paradigm, and their 'fit' for evaluation of social action
programs. These two paradigms are reflected in two general
approaches to evaluation: 1) the scientific paradigm tends
towards a quantitative, cost-effectiveness approach; and 2)
the naturalistic paradigm tends toward a qualitative,
illuminative approach.
In this section I discuss the sample of housing
evaluations as examples of the two different approaches to
evaluation. This discussion will serve not only to explain
60. Barclay Hudson writes: "[Scientific interpretation
of value choices can only deal with techniques, the
superficial expression of goals, just as the
scientist looking at a great work of art - a
painting or a piece of music - can only describe
the technology and mechanics of producing it, not
the substantive content." Hudson, 1975:82.
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the general rationale behind the evaluations, but also to
show how it affects the design of an evaluation and the type
of methods used.
Two general evaluation approaches: cost-effectiveness and
illuminative evaluation.
Howard Richards (1985) defines two general approaches to
evaluation, namely cost-effectiveness evaluation - or 'the
systems approach' - and illuminative evaluation. According to
Richards a system is cost-effective
... when, compared to the available alternatives, it
achieves the same objectives at a lesser cost. Or when,
compared to the alternatives, for the same amount of
money it achieves the objectives to a higher degree.*6
Following this rationale evaluation has to do with
measuring the degree to which the objectives of a system are
achieved, and how efficient the system is in achieving the
objectives.
As a challenge to this understanding of evaluation
Richards uses illuminative evaluation, belonging to a family
of evaluation approaches, arising from the naturalistic
paradigm, which includes, for example, responsive,
ethnographic, transactional and democratic evaluation
approaches.6 2 Malcolm Partlett defines illuminative
1*. Richards, 1985:8.
62. Malcolm Partlett, in his foreword to Richard's book
sees these approaches as belonging to the same
family, but "a family that, like all families, has
different degrees of closeness between its members,
a natural tendency for members to regard themselves
each as the family's centre, and despite
overlapping concerns, is not without its own
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evaluation as being 1) holistic, 2) responsive, 3) heuristic,
and 4) interpretive."3 It is holistic because it seeks "to
portray the program as a working whole, as an individual
organizational construction that needs to be examined
simultaneously from many different perspectives."'* It is
responsive, because it "designed to interest, to inform, and
to add to [the} understanding"6" of all concerned with the
program. It is heuristic, because "it is not a preordinate
design, ... Rather, a study evolves, with 'leads' being
followed up and new questions coming to fore."'' And, it is
interpretive, because "through tightly woven descriptions
with examples, with significant facts and figures, an overall
depiction of a program that does justice to the inherent
complexity and which throws light (hence 'illuminative') on
little-known or previously taken-for-granted features [the
illuminative evaluator acts] as an interpreter - interpreting
the program for those outside, or helping to interpret it for
those inside it."6 7
Examples of cost-effectiveness and illuminative evaluation in
the sample of housing projects.
disputes." Richards, 1985:xv.
6 ibid.
. ibid.
6 ibid.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
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I will argue, that the nine housing evaluations
introduced in first chapter can be understood from the
perspective of these two evaluation approaches. The
distribution between cost-effectiveness evaluations and
illuminative evaluations in the sample is very skewed; only
the evaluations from Bolivia and Ecuador (which were carried
out by the same evaluator, as part of a World Bank experiment
with 'innovative' evaluation methods) and the evaluation from
Southern Africa use illuminative approaches. The remaining
six evaluations use a cost-effectiveness approach.
Examples of illuminative evaluation.
Lawrence Salmen, the principal evaluator of the World
Bank projects in Bolivia and Ecuador states explicitly in his
book that his participant-observer evaluations have much in
common with illuminative evaluation.6 8
The evaluator of the Southern Africa project describes
his evaluation - or 'assessment' as he prefers to call it -
in terms that resemble illuminative evaluation on a number of
counts: The evaluation is meant as a resource for "those
locally involved in upgrading"6 " by highlighting situations,
'". Salmen, 1987:122. Salmen actually uses the term
"illustrative evaluation", rather than illuminative
evaluation in his book. This may be a typographical
error, since a footnote in the text makes reference to
"Evaluation as Illumination: A New Approach to the
Study of Innovatory Programs", Malcolm Partlett and
David Hamilton in Evaluation Studies Review Annual,
1976:140-157.
6. Southern Africa Evaluation Report:4.
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posing questions and raising issues concerning the project.
The evaluation had no preconceived design; the issues
included are those "which arose in the discussions [with
families and professionals involved in the project] and were
pointed out as more critical."7 0 And, the role of the
researcher is defined "more as a documentor and organizer of
the experiences and lessons, than as an evaluator."7 1 On the
other hand, there is little in the report to suggest that
cost-effectiveness was a major concern in evaluating the
project. 2
Examples of cost-effectiveness evaluation.
The remaining evaluations all represent the cost-
effectiveness approach. The following quote from the terms of
reference for the evaluation of the First El Salvador Sites
and Services Project illustrates the cost-effectiveness
approach nicely:
The Bank evaluation will seek to determine whether the
objectives mentioned elsewhere in this report are being
met over time, and whether project components (both
physical and institutional) yield the intended social
and economic impacts on project participants and on
associated institutions. If they do not, evaluation
should attempt to provide explanations for the
unanticipated effects. It should also test assumptions
concerning the project's goals, and thus provide the
basis for recommendations on future project design and
70 ibid.
71. ibid.
22 This may be related to the fact that the implementing
agency saw the project as a social service to one of
the poorest communities - as a gift to the people of
one project, as stated in the evaluation report.
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policy for both the Government and the Bank.7 "
A look at the Table of Contents of the El Salvador
evaluation and the Zambia evaluation - which are quite
similar - documents the importance placed on project
efficiency, which has been devoted a chapter in each
report.7 4 The two evaluations follow the World Bank's general
definition of the primary purposes of evaluation:
(a) to assess the extent to which the intended impacts
(increases in income, reduced incidence of certain
infections, improved housing quality etc.) have been
produced and
(b) to compare the cost-effectiveness of a project with
possible alternatives."
The UNDP/Habitat evaluation in Zimbabwe states as its
purpose to measure, analyze and evaluate the actual direct
and indirect outputs in relation to physical,
fiscal/economic, social and environmental components; and to
assess the replicability of the pilot projects in future
national housing programs.7 " Again, there is an emphasis on
measuring to which degree the objectives of the project were
achieved and on replicability, which in this case is another
3. Bamberger et al., 1982a:278.
. The similarity of the two evaluations should not cause
any surprise. Both projects are part of a five-year
evaluation study of four World Bank-financed urban
shelter projects. The study was designed to assess
major features of project design and to test the
evaluation methods used. This explains the similarity
of the evaluations. Source: Keare, 1982:i-ii.
Bamberger and Hewitt, 1985:1.
. Republic of Zimbabwe, 1986:12.
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way of saying efficiency. The discussion of replicability of
the project is mainly concerned with efficiency, e.g.
concerning infrastructure, house design, selection of
beneficiaries, and project management. The UNDP/Habitat
evaluation is also consistent with overall United Nations
guidelines for monitoring and evaluation. In a UN source-book
the purpose of evaluation is defined as providing
Information on programme effectiveness which would
provide answers to such questions as whether and to what
extent the programme has achieved its objectives, and on
what external conditions it depended;
Information on programme efficiency which would permit
determination as to whether programme results were
produced in the most economical way, i.e., by maximizing
outputs or minimizing inputs.7 7
This definition of evaluation is clearly in line with
Howard Richards' description of the cost-effectiveness
approach presented above.
Similarly, the three USAID evaluations belong to the
cost-effectiveness approach, focussing on intended versus
actual outputs, replicability and comparability with other
housing alternatives.7 8 USAID general guidelines defines the
purpose of evaluation and monitoring as
[t]o determine, quantitatively, the factors critical to
full or partial achievement of the stated policy goals
and project purposes 7 '
Furthermore USAID'S system for evaluating housing
. UN, 1978:1.
78. See for example USAID, 1982: Attachment A, pp.4 -lO.
. USAID, 1978:1.
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programs is meant to record "information that is critical to:
- Appropriate and rational program design;
- Efficient and economical program implementation; and
- Providing quantitative data against which to measure
project success.""*
The meaning of evaluation.
Barclay Hudson recognizes two distinctly different
dictionary meanings of the verb "to evaluate", which
illustrates the differences between cost-effectiveness and
illuminative evaluation:
What [to evaluate] has usually come to mean in the realm
of social policy evaluation is to "appraise", to set a
value on, to find the worth of, or the amount of.
Essentially this type of evaluation seeks a
correspondence between one thing and an externally
supplied unit of measure. Qualities are reduced to
categories and quantities, ... In contrast, a second
meaning of the term "to evaluate" is to "appreciate"
something, existentially, for what it is, "to recognize
gratefully, to esteem, to be fully and sensitively aware
of. 18 1
Whether by 'to evaluate' we mean 'to appraise' or 'to
appreciate' in many ways determines our choice of design and
research paradigm for evaluations.
There is also an apparent link between the institutional
affiliation of the evaluator and the evaluation approach
adopted, as demonstrated above. This issue will be discussed
in further detail in the concluding chapter of this paper.
8 . ibid.:2.
81. Hudson, 1975:86.
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CHAPTER 3
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT: A PREREQUISITE FOR EVALUATION.
I have so far reviewed the design and evaluation
methodologies used in nine evaluations of low income housing
projects in developing countries. I have also discussed the
scientific and naturalistic research paradigms and concluded
that the shortcomings of the scientific paradigm cannot be
"patched up" by methods based on the naturalistic paradigm.
Rather, the choice to be made lies within the naturalistic
paradigm and concerns which aspects of a project evaluation
lends themselves better to quantitative and qualitative
methods, respectively. Finally, I have demonstrated that the
two research paradigms are reflected in two general
approaches to evaluation: the scientific paradigm tends
towards a quantitative, cost-effectiveness approach; and the
naturalistic paradigm tends towards a qualitative,
illuminative approach. The nine evaluations initially
reviewed were used as examples of the two approaches.
Effective evaluation is, however, more than a
methodological problem. It also depends on an understanding
of the real world context in which the evaluation will be
carried out. In this chapter I will discuss why I believe
that a proper understanding of the socio-political context of
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low income housing projects is of overriding importance in
evaluation research.
Origin and Assumptions of Evaluation Research Concerning the
Political and Administrative Environment.
It has become clear through my research, that project
evaluation most often has depended on evaluation
methodologies developed in an American context. 2 The
underlying assumptions about the political and administrative
environment are, therefore, based on the experience of the
United States. Thomas Smith characterizes the key features of
the political climate in the United States as it relates to
policy evaluation as follows:
a stability in political and administrative institutions
and processes with regular elections for political
leadership and supremacy of the political sector over
the bureaucratic
democratic traditions and practices of individual and
group freedom, lack of suppression, reasonably 'open'
government, an active investigative media, freedom to
criticize political leaders, administrators and
government policies and programs
a diversity of centers of power with divisions and
rivalries between executive and legislative branches of
government and between federal, state and local levels
a slow, deliberate, incremental policy formulation
process which, in some policy arenas, leads to
competition between organized interests
a reasonably 'satisfied' well paid, professional, non-
corrupt public service which expects evaluation and
review as part of the job
an active and powerful political party out of power
seeking to gain electoral advantage
82. Feuerstein, 1985; Smith, 1985; and Staudt, 1985.
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a lack of fundamental ideological cleavages with major
political groups more pragmatic than ideological in
matters of policy, and with those groups strongly
supportive of existing social and political processes
an array of government and non-governmental bodies which
support, fund or conduct evaluations and a large number
of professional and social scientists from various
disciplines who teach about evaluation and conduct
evaluations
a large database of social and economic information
readily accessible to policy researchers"3
While these key features may not be an entirely accurate
portrayal of how western political systems and bureaucracies
actually function, they are assumptions which are de facto
built into evaluation methodology.
However accurate these assumptions are as a description
of the political and administrative system in the United
States, they are wholly unsuited to the developing country
context. In fact, arguably, one could prepare a list of the
key features of government in most developing countries by
simply inverting the features listed above: unstable
political and administrative institutions, undemocratic
policy making processes, centralization of power, abrupt
policy changes, etc. But, rather than providing a general
outline of the politico-bureaucratic context of developing
countries I shall take a closer look at a specific case: the
Dandora Sites and Services Project, in Nairobi, Kenya.
The Political and Bureaucratic Context of Low Income Housing
in Nairobi, Kenya.
83. Smith, 1985:129-130.
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During a stay in Kenya, where I studied the Dandora Site
and Service Project and other low income housing projects in
Nairobi", I became aware of the extent to which the socio-
political context affects the outcome and impact of low
income housing projects.
The Dandora Project began in 1975. The project was
designed as a sites and services project of approximately
6,000 plots with related community facilities, including 6
primary schools, 2 health clinics, 2 community centers, 6
markets, 400 market stalls, a workshop cluster, and a small
sports complex. The plots were serviced with a core unit,
water supply, and sewers; the project has roads, street
lighting, and garbage collection. Material loans, and
assistance to allottees on technical and community
development issues were provided. Finance for the project was
provided by the World Bank and the Kenyan Government-
contributing approximately $16 million and $14 million
respectively.8 s
I will show, using a number of examples, how the
political and bureaucratic environment in Kenya had a direct
influence on the goals, design, implementation, and outcome
of Dandora and other projects . These examples paint a
4** I spent three months in Kenya doing field work for a
paper on institutional performance in low income
housing. My research approach was similar to that
described as illuminative evaluation in a previous
section of this paper. See also Rasmussen, 1987.
85. Rasmussen, 1987:21.
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picture of a political and administrative reality quite
different from that which is implicit in many planning
approaches. The failure to understand this has led to
unrealistic planning and poor project design.
The examples I have selected illustrate the degree to
which the political and administrative context has influenced
the Dandora project's development and, therefore, how
important it is to include an analysis of that context in any
evaluation. I have grouped the examples under 5 main
headings: 1) Access to the planning process ; 2) donor
influence and conflicts within the power structure; 3)
patronage politics and corruption; 4)bureaucratic
constraints; and, 5) availability of resources.
Access to the planning process.
When Dandora was designed in the 1970's little effort
was made to solicit input from the urban poor or from
potential allottees. As a result project participants' only
option was to participate in the planning process during the
implementation phase in an ad hoc manner."* A case in point
is what was planned for Dandora's commercial and industrial
sector and what actually happened.
As envisioned by the project planners, who hoped to
control the growth of the informal economy, commercial and
industrial activities were to be licensed businesses located
in clusters which were to form a "spinal core" in the
86 Grindle (1981) develops this point nicely.
61
community. Market stalls were built to house the businesses.
As a visit to Dandora makes clear, this arrangement has been
a failure. Businesses have not been confined to the "spinal
core" where it has been difficult to rent the market stalls
(compare the K.Sh.300 monthly rent with the K.Sh.1O fee for a
street vendors license.) Instead, a large, informal economy
has developed throughout Dandora. Many plots have been
turned into all-manner of business: shops, tea kiosks, bars,
lodging houses, dry cleaners, etc. Unless the structure
itself violates codes, the Housing Development Department 7
seems to have acquiesced in the growth of trade in areas of
the project not originally planned as commercial areas.
It is by their deeds, then, that the residents of
Dandora have had a voice in the shaping of their community
and not because they have been given a voice in the planning
process. The result is that an important part of Dandora's
evolution as a community has been both unregulated and
unplanned.
Donor influence on policy and conflict within the power
structure.
In many developing countries, where financial resources
are inadequate to meet development needs, large donor
institutions can have a major impact on development policy.
This is especially true because it is more often than not the
donor which approaches the recipient government with plans
87 The Housing Development Department is responsible for
the project's implementation and management.
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for a project and not the government which approaches the
donor.** By taking the initiative on project design and by
controlling the funds, a donor agency is in a good position
to tag conditions on to any agreement it makes with an aid
recipient. In practice, however, an agreement on conditions
between a donor and a government may not have the desired
effect if agencies within the government's administrative
bureaucracy either ignore or interpret the conditions to suit
their own outlooks and agendas. The history of the Dandora
project provides a clear example of this process.
The widespread implementation of minimum sites and
services projects, of which Dandora was one of the first,
represented a break with past planning practice in Kenya.
Previously, the Government- lead by President Jomo Kenyatta-
had vigorously opposed implementation of low standard housing
projects. In 1971 Kenyatta warned that he would fire any
official who approved the construction of what he termed
"native-type" houses."
88. Tendler, 1975.
. The quote is from a report cited by Temple and Temple
(1980:236): "President Kenyatta warned at the weekend
he will sack any of his Ministers who continue to treat
Kenyans as the colonialist did by building them
"native-type" houses not suitable for human
habitation."
An alternative view to the reason for Kenyatta's
opposition to sites and services projects is offered by
Stren (1982:93): "The reasoning often heard was that,
if building and sanitation standards were allowed to
fall in Nairobi, tourism would suffer and international
firms would hesitate to locate in Kenya."
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By 1975 , when the agreement was signed with the World
Bank for 6,000 minimum standard site and service projects at
Dandora, the government had had a change of heart. There
seems to have been two reasons for the policy shift. First, a
recognition of the sheer magnitude of the housing shortage
caused by a rapidly increasing population' . Second, was the
influence of the World Bank. I believe it is safe to say
that had it not been for the World Bank Kenya would not have
seen large scale sites and services projects until much later
- if ever.
But the overall acceptance of a low income housing
policy based on the self-help sites and services concept did
not mean, however, that all aspects of the policy were
accepted by all levels of government. The dislike for
lowering the standards persisted in a number of government
agencies creating serious roadblocks to the project's
implementation.
At the insistence of the World Bank the more relaxed
Grade II by-laws of the Building Code were adopted for Phase
I of the Dandora project (1,024 plots), instead of the more
stringent Grade I by-laws. This was accomplished by re-zoning
the area through a resolution of the Works and Town Planning
Committee in January 1975. In May the following year - after
plot allocation had started and construction was well
90. The average urban growth rate for Nairobi for 1969-79
was 5.3%, which meant adding more than 300,000 new
residents of the city. Source: Rasmussen, 1987:11-14.
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underway - law enforcement officers, especially from the
Public Health Department of the City Council, refused to
approve the plans since they did not conform with the
Building Code and the Public Health Act. Lowering the
standards, these officials claimed, would result in health
hazards and unhygienic, uncontrolled human settlements. As
the Dandora Project Manager put it: "This was therefore a
problem of the interpretation of the law."' .
It took almost 6 months of negotiations among the World
Bank, the City Council, and the Government to resolve the
issue.
Since it was too late to make amendments to Phase I the new
standards were accepted, but phase II experienced eleven
major design changes, causing serious delays and increasing
cost of construction due to inflation and price escalation.
The controversy also resulted in delays in issuing house type
plans for allottees and in the construction of demonstration
houses. The additional cost incurred from adopting higher
standards was estimated to K.Sh. 27.6 million. 2
The compromise did not resolve the issue of standards
for low income housing in Kenya, but was instead a political
compromise, among various agencies, to save the Dandora
project.9
. Wanjohi and Chana, 1977:18
92. ibid.
ibid.
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Vigorous opposition continued against efforts by the
main agencies of the central government and the World Bank to
impose the new, lower standards. The opposition, in Nairobi
in particular, had powerful supporters, among which were the
National Housing Corporation (NHC) - a para-statal agency
under the Housing Ministry and the intermediary lending
agency for government housing projects - and the Director of
City Planning and Architecture in Nairobi.'* The Director of
City Planning and Architecture held particularly strong views
on low standard housing, as this excerpt from the minutes of
a Housing Committee meeting in January 1986 indicates:
The Director of City Planning and Architecture reported
that although the objective of the site and service
projects was to stabilize urban population in the City,
it had not done much to solve the problem of low income
housing in the City. There was, therefore, a need to
review the whole concept of tenant purchase schemes
versus rental schemes. The Department's views were that
the [Nairobi City] Commission should now concentrate
more on rental housing rather than site and services
schemes or tenant purchase scheme."
. It has been said about the NHC: "The National Housing
Corporation which is a front runner in the site and
services schemes programmes in Kenya is most allergic
to alternative technologies."; the comment was made in
a recent paper from the Housing Research and
Development Unit (n.d.:17) - a government funded
research institute, which devotes large amounts of its
research to low standard design and construction
techniques particularly for site and services projects.
Nairobi City Commission, 1986. One can only
speculate why the Director would express such
sentiments in light of the very poor performance of
rental housing in providing affordable housing for
low income groups. Furthermore, a widespread belief
is held that the problems experienced with sites
and services projects are not so much related to
the concept of sites and services, but rather to
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There are efforts on the national level to resolve the
problem of housing standards. Most recently, in 1987, the
Ministry of Works, Housing, and Physical Planning submitted a
policy paper to Parliament recommending that its policy of
lowering housing standards be accepted as a sessional paper,
thus making it a legal binding national policy.
The issue of standards provides a clear example of
government policies and project agreements being severely
altered to the detriment of both the over-all project
(because of cost increases to the funders) and the project
beneficiaries (because of project delays and more costly
construction standards). It also had another effect: with the
increased cost of construction because of the raised standard
of Phase II , many of the original allottees sold their
plots, because construction became too expensive. Thus
instead of the intended target group, many relatively well-
off people entered the project.'' The end result of the
the insistence on literal self-help (thus providing
loans inadequate for the sub-contract form of self-
help), serious construction delays (mainly due to
corrupt government practices), etc. My guess is
that it has very little to do with concern for the
urban poor - and a lot to do with the politics of
power. Sites and services and upgrading projects
are the responsibilities of the Housing Development
Department, whereas rental housing falls under the
auspices of the City Planning and Architecture
Department. The rivalry between the two departments
has been known for a long time.
. And, "Furthermore, with the increasing cost of
construction due to the various delays and
inflation ... , it gave an opportunity to the income
groups above the specified target income groups to
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inter-agency fight over housing standards had the important
consequence of re-defining who would live in Dandora.
Institutional aspects of low income housing in Nairobi.
The World Bank also put a lot of emphasis on the
institutional aspects of low income housing in Nairobi. In
accordance with the trend in development administration,
during the 1970's, the Bank helped create a new department to
implement Dandora, as well as a matching City Council
committee. The Dandora committee was later to be expanded to
include all low income housing in Nairobi, this occurred in
1978 when it became the Housing Development Department.9 7
The Dandora department was originally vested with
plenary powers on matters of staff appointments, bidding
procedures, and certain expenditure. The granting of plenary
powers was intended to provide the department with relative
autonomy and thus safeguard it from many of the problems of a
highly centralized and politicized government bureaucracy."9
Although the World Bank managed to put pressure on the
government when negotiating the project, within six months
the decision granting the new committee plenary powers was
occupy the plots,". Chana, 1984:32.
The scope of the Housing Development Department's
activities are much more limited than originally
proposed by the plan.
98. Vesting the department with plenary powers does not
guarantee that mismanagement and corruption will not be
factors. By centralizing more of the decision-making in
the department, the Bank's role as a watchdog is,
however, simplified.
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revoked by the Nairobi City Council. Internal struggles for
power among city councilors and officers led to the
dismantling of the new housing department's relative autonomy
in certain areas of decision-making.
Land for low income housing.
The Dandora Site and Service Project is not the only
example of plans running aground on bureaucratic realities.
The history of squatter upgrading projects in Nairobi is
another case in point. In fact, Nairobi has no significant
upgrading projects; out of a total of 8,750 units
constituting the Planned Physical Housing Output 1983/84 -
1987/88 only 200 of those units were upgrading - or a little
more than 2%. This compares very unfavorably with other
cities: in Mombasa 34% of output was upgrading, in Kisumu
67%, with a national average of 22%.'' These statistics seem
even more puzzling in light of the fact that 30% of Nairobi's
population - by a conservative estimate - live in squatter
settlements, and since the government strategies (as stated
in the Development Plan 1984-88) are to produce low income
housing through sites and services programs and settlement
upgrading.100
Nairobi has not lacked initiatives on squatter upgrading
. Republic of Kenya, 1984:168
10 . ibid.:165.
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projects. The Second Urban Project1 "1 funded by the World
Bank originally included several sites for upgrading. During
a cut-back in 1981 the upgrading components of the project
were, however, omitted. These cut-backs were begun in 1980
when revised estimates, projected to the anticipated date of
construction, showed a considerable increase over original
projections made at the time of the project's proposal.
Since the World Bank funds were limited by the project
agreement and the Kenyan government would not commit itself
to providing additional funds the whole project was revised.
Significantly, the squatter upgrading projects - all of
which were deleted from the Second Urban Project in Nairobi
during the revision - suffered major problems with land
acquisition. In a report submitted by the Director of Housing
Development in 1986, identifying housing projects for the
Urban IV study in Nairobi these upgrading projects are
brought up again:
These projects' 2 involve upgrading of settled areas by
provision of infrastructure and sanitation which is
generally lacking in all the above areas. One of the
major problems in the above areas has been the land
acquisition and provision for this should be made during
the financing.10 3 (emphasis added)
11 The Dandora project is also known under the name
the First Urban Project. The Second Urban Project
included sites and services and squatter upgrading
projects in Nairobi and other major cities in Kenya.
102 Baba Dogo, Mathare Valley, and Riruta/Kawangware
upgrading projects.
10 3 Nairobi City Commission, 1986:1148.
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Up until this time all but one of the low income housing
projects in Nairobi have been implemented on government owned
land'"*, and the problem of land acquisition has thus not
been an issue. The squatter upgrading projects are, however,
a different story.
The owners of land in squatter areas usually find very
little incentive to sell their land to the government for
purposes of squatter upgrading projects. As areal photos and
visits to such sites easily reveal, many of Nairobi's
squatter settlements are not incremental developments with
dwellings haphazardly constructed by the individual squatter
on an ad-hoc basis. Large tracts of land are covered with the
so-called 'company houses' - houses constructed by private
land owners and developers. Although the quality of company
housing vary greatly, this housing does not comply with
government building codes and the Public Health Act.
Furthermore, in a tight housing market very exploitative
rents are likely to prevail. The value of land owned
privately in the squatter settlements is thus very high,
because it generates an income while the landowner is waiting
for an opportune moment to either sell or develop the land.
In addition, in the long term the potential market value of
the land compared to the current price for land offered by
104 Mathare Valley North Sites and Services Scheme was
implemented on privately owned land acquired by the
government. Land acquisition proved to be a major issue
holding up the project and resulting in delays and
consequent cutting back of the project.
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the government may indeed provide little incentive for
landowners to sell. In Kenya, the government has made little
effort to acquire the land through legal processes, and it
seems likely that landowners and developers of company
housing benefit from contacts within the government.
This is another example of how the planning agenda has
been set, more or less, by a donor agency (the World Bank)
without a clear understanding of the political context.
Whether the Kenyan government was aware of the land
acquisition problems prior to signing the project agreement -
perhaps hoping the funds could be diverted to other use,
should the policy flounder - is hard to say. More likely, it
is yet another example of dissonance within government -
strongly encouraged by a close political relationship between
landowners and politicians, among whom there is often
overlap.
Patronage politics and targeting the poor.
Patronage politics has influenced the development of low
income housing in Nairobi in several ways. Tampering with
plot allocation and bidding procedures has been notorious;
rules concerning the collection of arrears, eviction of
allottees and demolition of illegal structures have not been
enforced; and, the operation of stone quarries near Kayole
and Umoja projects1 5 , which threatens both the physical
structures and the subterrainean infrastructure, continued
105. A World Bank and a USAID low income housing project.
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several years after an order from the City Council ordered
the quarries closed. I shall focus my remarks about patronage
politics to those aspects which had a negative impact on the
original objective of targeting the poor.
Instead of a city government based on some notion of
impartiality and efficiency, the City of Nairobi has
experienced times when patronage politics and corruption have
run rampant within the City Council. In 1983 the problem
became so acute that the Minister of Local Government in the
national government replaced all politically elected
councilors with appointed commissioners. 10 * In 1987 the
Minister summarily fired the Town Clerk and most directors of
departments.
The patronage politics and corruption at City Hall had
direct effect on plot allocation for Dandora Phase II when,
according to Father George MacInnes' who has lived in the
project a number of years, 700 plots were sold cheaply to
"friends" of Nairobi city councilors. By displacing 700
allottees belonging to the original target group, the
Council's action had the practical effect of re-drawing the
original target group by introducing a more affluent group of
people into Dandora.
In fact, there are several reasons why Dandora became
10". New elections were scheduled for 1988, but have not
been held to date.
107. Interview February, 1987. Several other people, with
whom I spoke, confirmed Father MacInnes' account.
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attractive to people with incomes well above the target
group. First, national housing policy has not adequately
addressed the problem of urban middle income groups, thus
leading to a spill-over into places like Dandora in a way
similar to the gentrification process in cities of the
developed countries. Secondly, middle-income rents have
doubled in Nairobi between 1980-85.'0* And thirdly, projects
like Dandora represent the quickest return on real-estate
development available at the low end of the scale. In middle-
income developments, the cost of land represents 25% of
development cost - a cost omitted in Dandora.
The introduction of more affluent people into Dandora
had other consequences as well. This group had greater
resources with which to set up businesses in Dandora such as
stores and lodging-houses. This put a competitive squeeze on
efforts by the poorer allottees to establish businesses.
Since over half of the poor allottees in Phase II came from
the Mathare Valley squatter areas, where they had made their
income in the informal sector often in the provisioning trade
or by subletting rooms, the increased competition directly
affected their income and their ability to pay project
charges and fees.
Patronage politics have also affected the collection of
arrears. It has been common practice that eviction notices
served to allottees in rent arrears of six months or over did
1 ". International Labour Office,1986.
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not lead to evictions. Instead through "various Committee
resolutions"1"' fresh eviction notices were served to the
allottees. While such practices may be justifiable in many
cases, the arrears have continued to accumulate and had
reached an average of K.Sh. 2005 per plot in Dandora in June
1986 or a total of more than K.Sh.1l million, thus affecting
the viability of the project.1 1
Enforcement of rules on building size is another case
where patronage politics has altered original plans. Dandora
phase II's 96 multi-story buildings stand as landmarks to the
failure of the authorities to enforce the project's ban on
multi-story buildings. This type of corruption finds its way
down to the building inspectors who fail to report illegal
structures.
While this type of patronage politics and the petty
corruption which accompany it have had a detrimental effect
on the project as a whole, its real victims have been the
poor who have neither the money nor the influence to
participate in the patron-client game.
Bureaucratic Constraints
The Housing Development Department in Nairobi, the
direct descendant of the Dandora Project Committee, has
responsibility for most low-income housing development in
109. Housing Development Department, 1981:39-40.
1 10 Interview with accountant in the Finance Section of the
Housing Development Department.
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Nairobi. Three things characterize the Housing Development
Department's contact with its bureaucratic environment: there
is a high degree of control and power centralized in the
national government; the bureaucratic procedures, which have
roots in the British colonial period, are very cumbersome;
and coordination and cooperation between the Housing
Development Department and other parts of the bureaucracy
seems limited.
The centralization of power in the bureaucracy often
affects the Housing Development Department in a very direct
fashion. For instance, the bidding procedure prescribes that
approval of the Minister of Local Government be given, if the
lowest bidder is not awarded the contract.'1 1 This is taken
quite literally, and in one case it delayed the awarding of a
contract for several months when the Minister was
hospitalized and not available to personally give his
approval. The Deputy Minister was not empowered to act in his
place.
This high degree of centralization has had its effect on
Dandora's development, often in ways that may not have been
apparent to decision makers in the central government. A
case in point is a hiring freeze for manual workers ordered
by the Ministry allegedly to curb excessive hiring of manual
111. Government of Kenya, 1978:79. The anecdote about
the delay in the contract award: interview with
Assistant Director, Housing Development Department,
February, 1987.
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workers for patronage reasons. The hiring freeze was ordered
across the board without regard for job categories. This
meant that the Housing Development Department was unable to
hire watchmen to guard construction sites in Dandora. In
Kenya, where there is a high incidence of theft from
construction sites, this led to cost increase from lost
building materials and machinery, from delays in construction
due to lack of materials, and eventually from the hiring of
private watchmen at higher costs.
The bureaucratic procedures at the local government
level in Kenya can only be described as cumbersome. The
decision-making process at the municipal level often involves
a Chief Officers Meeting, a meeting of the relevant standing
committee (i.e. Housing Development Committee), and a Finance
Committee Meeting. It is common practice that matters are
deferred from committee to committee, and from meeting to
meeting. Even very serious issues get deferred, causing
delays in decision-making of up to one month or more, until
the next committee meeting. Often, further consultations or
reports to be prepared between meetings are not completed.
The Chairman of the Housing Development Department called
this problem, "a kind of disease."1 1 2
The committee meeting system as conducted by Nairobi
City Commission requires the presence of the director of HDD
112. Minutes of the meeting of the Housing Development
Committee, January 1987.
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or his representative at any other committee meeting where
issues related to housing development are discussed. While in
principle this is desirable, the presence of the director is
required in a large number of meetings, taking time away from
his principle role as the department manager.
Cooperation and coordination with other municipal
departments is necessitated by the design of the department,
which makes it dependent, for many services, on other
departments such as the City Engineer's Department (CED), the
Water and Sewerage Department (WSD), the Social Services and
Housing Department (SSHD) and the City Planning and
Architecture Department (CPAD). The HDD's relationship with
the other departments is of varying quality. In general,
relations to all departments but the WSD, which has a
permanent representative assigned for housing projects, are
seen as problematic by the HDD staff, because of
interference, lack of flexibility or for slowness in
completing work. The relation to the CPAD has been
characterized as particularly bad. While the CED has been
accused of delaying projects, the CPAD is described as
notoriously slow in approving plans, as having approved
illegal structures, as failing to provide staff requested for
specific purposes (i.e. surveying), and as being generally
obstructionist.
Lack of resources.
Physical resources, financial resources and human
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resources have all been scarce at different times in the
Dandora project - Kenya suffered a temporary crisis in the
availability of building materials leading to vast price
increases; during a time of general revenue-crisis the Kenyan
Government withheld disbursements for the project; and
understaffing and the hiring of underqualified personnel has
seriously impacted the performance of the implementing
agency. As a result of this scarcity of resources there have
been delays - measured in years - of the implementation of
low income housing in Nairobi.
Financial constraints have also affected cost recovery.
The City of Nairobi has, since the abolition of Graduated
Personal Tax by central government in 1973, practically been
without capacity to generate revenue. Thus, the City depends
mostly on grants from central government, since the system
for obtaining foreign capital is also strictly controlled by
the Treasury.1 1 3 Lack of funds obviously means that the
provision of services will be poor. In a study of women in
the Dandora project Nimpuno describes how the dissatisfaction
with municipal services affected some women's willingness to
pay:
[A category] of defaulters were those who did not pay
because of dissatisfaction with the level of services
from the municipality. The failure of infrastructural
maintenance by the municipality has had serious
implications for the area as a whole. On one hand there
is a severe drop in standards due to failures, e.g.
drains are blocked by refuse dumping, leaking water
113. Akivaga et al.,1985:4.
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mains are unreported and there is an absence in refuse
collection. On the other hand the problem gets
compounded by the negative and indifferent attitude of
the residents.'' 4
In this way resource-shortages find their causes outside
the immediate context of the project: supply-side failures in
the construction industry, affecting availability of building
materials; central and local government general revenue
crises, affecting disbursements and public services; and the
mismatch between demand for highly educated technical staff,
the educational output, affecting staffing of the
implementing agency, and the wage structure of the public
sector.
Conclusion on the low income housing experience in Nairobi.
The extended discussion of the low income housing
experience in Nairobi in this chapter has underlined a number
of the kinds of problems one might find in a Third World
context. I have portrayed the politico-bureaucratic
environment as partisan and inefficient, affecting both the
implementation process, the project outcome, and the impact
on the original target-group.
In Kenya there is even additional reason to take the
political context into account when doing evaluation
research. The centralization of power at the top, along with
an almost total intolerance of dissidence, has increased
drastically in Kenya in the last few years, dictated by
. Nimpuno, 1986:24.
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President Moi's government. The increased control and at
times severe punishment of dissidence creates an increasingly
difficult environment for evaluation and poses serious
ethical questions. The government may not want an evaluation
, if the evaluation points to problems in the politico-
bureaucratic environment. The more useful forms of
evaluation for policy formulators and program implementors
which provide explanations for why policies fail by
considering both policy feasibility and execution, are likely
to encounter resistance.115 Alternatively, evaluation
strategies may be requested that ignore the political
context, such as cost-benefit analysis and other types of
analysis not concerned with explaining why certain outcomes
occur. Finally, of particular importance to the evaluation
from the perspective of ethics, evaluation findings may be
misutilized or abused by an authoritarian government to
expose and penalize opposition. Or, if indeed the evaluator
is perceived as a representative of an unpopular government
and its officials, the data-collection process may be
severely impeded.
There may seem little hope for effective evaluation in
much of the Third World since the most useful forms of
evaluation may be perceived as a threat by authoritarian
regimes. But, dissonance at different levels of government
and the presence of different actors in development
115. Smith,1985:142.
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assistance may constitute an opening for evaluation.
Gender aspects: Women's participation in housing projects.
In the past very limited knowledge has been generated
about gender aspects of mainstream development projects,
including most sites and services projects. Gender aspects
have generally not been included in project or evaluation
designs, and little is thus known about whether and how women
participate in such projects, and about the impact a project
may have on women in particular. This reflects a general lack
of concern for women's special role on the part of
government, donor agencies and evaluators - and in the
society as a whole.1 1 ' Even where baseline data are
disaggregated by sex a remarkable absence of conclusions
about a given project's impact on women is often found.
Notably, all the evaluations reviewed in this paper but
one1 1 7 fail to make conclusions concerning women's
participation in the projects. Lawrence Salmen notes that the
exposure, he experienced through his participant-observer
evaluation, has resulted in a personal awareness that "both
women and youths were sources of energy for development that
were largely untapped by [the] projects."1 1 8 He further notes
that women spend more time in the neighborhood, have a
11'. This trend does, however, appear to be changing; see
for example OECD, 1988:8.
117. The UNDP evaluation of Kwekwe and Gutu projects in
Zimbabwe excluded.
118. Salmen, 1987:82.
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greater awareness of the relationship between health and
sanitation, are more burdened by the lack of good
infrastructure, and are often more responsible than many of
the men. Salmen, however, also fails to provide a detailed
understanding, backed by factual information, about the
gender aspects of the projects he evaluated.
The lack of gender related findings in evaluations of
low income housing projects is unfortunate since female
headed households, as discussed earlier, are common in many
low income areas. And, furthermore, the existing evidence -
however limited - reveals important differences between
women's and men's experience with, for example, self help
housing projects.1'
To form an understanding of women's role in low income
housing it is important to understand the social context,
i.e. the role of women in society in general. In Kenyan
society, for example, the role of women stands in stark
contrast to the perceived reality of the decision makers
responsible for the assumptions behind and the design of
sites and services projects in Kenya. Again, I shall use data
from the Dandora Project in Nairobi to illustrate my point.
Two of the requirements that had to be met to qualify
for a plot in Dandora were that the applicant had to be the
head of the household and could not own property elsewhere in
Nairobi. This last requirement also counted for the
11'. Nimpuno, 1986.
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applicant's spouse. In Kenyan society, however, polygamy is
still common. This could have led to the exclusion of women
in polygamous marriages, even if they had their own household
- which is the norm in polygamous marriages in Kenya - and
were the only source of income of that household. If their
husbands owned property in Nairobi, they would face exclusion
from the project.12" This serves as a reminder of the
importance of possible ways the project design could have
been biased against women and, thus, the importance of
extending the evaluation to those who were discouraged from
applying or rejected by the project after application.
Another example is the tradition in Kenya which makes it
difficult for women to inherit land.12 ' The access to owning
a plot in Dandora, i.e. legally getting a title to land along
with better housing conditions is a significantly bigger
asset to women than to men.
In line with the previous discussion about inquiry into
social action programs I shall not attempt to provide an
exhaustive list of aspects of women's participation in sites
and services projects. Some themes for an evaluation can,
however, be provided. Kathleen Staudt argues, based on her
evaluations of women in three mainstream development projects
in the Caribbean12 2 , that the minimum information required in
12o. ibid.:9.
121. ibid.:5.
122. Staudt, 1985.
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any women-sensitive evaluation is:
- a description of women's and men's labor, incomes and
responsibilities, and how these have changed in the
household and the community
- analyses of special needs and constraints on women and
men and how these affect participation
- sex-disaggregated data on all outcomes and impacts
- analyses of women's and men's participation in project
decision-making
- conclusions about changes, absolute and relative at
the household level and at the community level
- interpretations about why changes occur
Paula Nimpuno's study of gender issues in project
planning and implementation in Dandora'23 , from which the
examples in this section come, provides valuable insight into
which aspects of a sites and services project may be of
particular importance to women. Nimpuno' study compares the
assumptions behind the design of the project with the reality
of the background of women allottees. Major discrepancies
were found between the assumptions of the project design and
the reality of women's ability to meet the initial
requirements for eligibility to the project; their ability to
make regular payments and raise money for the down-payment;
and their ability to engage in true self help
construction.1 2 * Based on such findings the project would
123. Nimpuno, 1986.
124. Women as well as men chose the contracting form of
self help. For women, however, this had greater
financial implications than for men. The
contracting form of self help increases the cost of
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largely discourage women from applying and also cause a lot
of women to drop out. Through her study it became clear,
however, that women were actually included in the project due
to "gender planning purely at the level of the implementing
agency." 2 ' In this sense, some of the bias against women in
the project design was eliminated by project management.
Furthermore, as described previously, despite the fact that
many allottees fall into arrears evictions have been rare. It
appears that project management has accepted that many women
are not able to pay on a monthly basis, but that they depend
on income from gifts and transfers from family and friends or
income from crop harvest.
Nimpuno also lists reasons why women heads of households
- despite their initial problems - are the most stable group
in the Dandora community:
- the project gives women the opportunity to own a plot
in an urban area which was not possible before;
- although both women and men tend to consider the house
an economic asset, women also see the house and plot
in relation to their families and emphasize therefore
the social value of the house and plot;
- the possibility of subletting rooms is very important
for many women as it is often their main source of
construction, and women - a large percentage being
self employed - had much greater difficulties in
raising the extra money for construction than many
men, many of which had jobs and could obtain loans
from employers or cooperatives. Furthermore, women
being unfamiliar with the role of supervisor of a
construction site were often cheated by the
contractors, which again resulted in increased costs.
125 s.ibid.:25.
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income.
Conclusion on gender aspects.
Through my discussion of women's participation in
Dandora I have pointed out significant differences in the
experience of women and men in low income housing projects.
Such differences are undoubtedly common. From this
perspective it is a serious omission that gender issues
rarely enter into evaluation studies. For evaluation to be
effective it must also be gender sensitive.
The general lack of information about gender issues
related to low income housing projects has significance for
how an evaluation of such issues could be approached. If pre-
project data is generally limited, then sex-disaggregated
data is, to be sure, even more limited. It is also more
difficult to establish initial working hypotheses for a
gender-specific inquiry, since little previous knowledge
exists on gender issues in relation to low income housing.
Clearly, an evaluation of gender issues must lean heavily on
'knowledge discovering' methods: participant-observation, in-
depth interviews, case studies, etc. - of course supported by
quantitative interpretations whenever feasible - to generate
an understanding of what is significant to the experience of
women in this type of projects.
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF EVALUATION AND CHOICE OF EVALUATOR.
The final aspect of my discussion of evaluation in a
Third World context concerns the choice of evaluator and - as
discussed in chapter 2 - the apparent link between the
institutional affiliation of the evaluator and the evaluation
approach adopted.
The discussion of the choice of evaluator can be
approached from two perspectives. First, there is the
individual skills perspective, which is concerned with the
match between the professional and personal skills of the
evaluator (or the evaluation team) and the nature of the
evaluation, including choice of methodology. Second, there is
the institutional perspective, which is concerned with the
type of institutional setting conducive to the goals and
methods of the evaluation. I shall discuss both perspectives.
The Skills Perspective.
The role of the evaluator - and hence who can fulfill
this role - is directly dependent on choice of evaluation
method. For instance, participatory evaluation practiced by
Oxfam America and other agencies1 2 ', in which the role of the
126. See Appendix I for a detailed description of
participatory evaluation.
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evaluator is that of a facilitator12 , may require skills in
the areas of participatory learning and teaching,
negotiation, qualitative methods and basic quantitative data
analysis. On the other hand, evaluation using experimental
design and cost benefit analysis, in which the role of the
evaluator is that of an expert, requires skills in
quantitative analysis. This places some initial conditions on
the choice of evaluator or evaluation team. I have in a
previous chapter argued for the application of a naturalistic
evaluation paradigm, making choices within that paradigm
concerning the use of quantitative and qualitative methods
for evaluating different aspects of a project. From this
argument it follows that both quantitative and qualitative
skills will be needed. The evaluation of water and sewerage
systems provides an example of the need for both qualitative
and quantitative skills, since it involves both project
participants' subjective satisfaction and priorities for
expenditure, as well as the system's affordability and
physical capacity.
I will argue that there is a need to engage more people
with an understanding of the socio-political context in
evaluation. I shall not, however, embark upon a discussion
here about the qualifications and qualities of the different
professions engaged in evaluation.
Status of affiliation of the evaluator is one of the
127. See for example Feuerstein, 1985.
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aspects in the debate over the choice of evaluator that has
received attention. The debate has often been phrased as
dichotomies, i.e. insider versus outsider, or expatriate
versus local evaluator. The debate has concerned the
evaluator's ability to produce unbiased, insightful findings
that also are of practical relevance to the immediate users
of the evaluation.
First, the insider versus the outsider. An outsider is
usually defined as somebody external to the project team as
well as to the agency responsible for the evaluation.
Outsiders can bring a breadth of experience to the
evaluations and limit the bias of self-evaluation. As the
Chairman of ODA's1 2 8 Projects and Evaluation Committee has
pointed out:
It would ... look rather odd to outsiders viewing our
evaluation system as a system if it seemed to consist
almost entirely of people inside evaluating the
organisation from within.12 '
A more practical reason for choosing an outsider lies in
the small evaluation units of many agencies, representing
limited numbers of staff and different skills.
The outsider's lack of understanding of the information
needs of the users of the evaluation is often cited as a
12*. ODA is the British bilateral development assistance
organization.
129. Browning, 1984:137. Other donors do not share this
view. They have found that insiders with no direct
association to a project can bring the same objectivity
to an evaluation as an outsider. OECD, 1986:46.
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problem. The outsider does not understand the internal
dynamics of the organization using the evaluation and thus
has difficulties in making appropriate policy
recommendations, a demand many evaluators are faced with. I
believe that adequate briefing of the evaluator about the
user's needs can significantly enhance the evaluator's
ability to produce useful findings. Whether the evaluator
should be charged with the responsibility of making specific
policy recommendations is another issue. A solution to this
problem, which is practiced by an increasing number of
donors13 0 , is participation by an in-house member of staff on
the evaluation team.
The debate over the expatriate versus the local
evaluator has generally been over objectivity versus insight
in the context of a given project. Again, there are
advantages as well as drawbacks to each type of evaluator.
The expatriate may indeed be more objective and, due to
previous experience from similar projects elsewhere,
contribute a broader understanding of both project context
and evaluation methodology to the evaluation. The expatriate
evaluator, who may be more independent of any local power
structures, may be able to establish a more open relationship
with the project participants and avoid cooptation. On the
other hand, there is a danger that the expatriate may fail to
understand the local context, which can lead to a failure to
130. OECD, 1986:47.
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grasp the reasons for certain types of social behavior. As a
result evaluation findings may have little relevance. A
bigger problem, however, is cooptation of the expatriate
evaluator by the employing agency.
A shortage of local evaluators may affect the choice of
evaluator, as might the degree of personal autonomy and the
practice of patronage politics in the local context. It would
be unwise, however, to opt for an expatriate evaluator based
solely on the risk of cooptation of the local evaluator.
Lawrence Salmen's experience with participant-observer
evaluation by locals, as described in chapter two, suggests
that local evaluators can indeed be impartial.
As should be clear at this point no one evaluator can
easily fulfill the different requirements outlined in this
section. A team seems the obvious solution for how to combine
different skills, breadth of experience and local
understanding, and at the same time avoid serious biases.
But, what may be ideal, may not be possible. As with any
other activity in development assistance the available funds
will determine what is possible. Within this framework the
choice of evaluator must be made. The institutional
perspective, presented in the following section, offers an
additional perspective on the choice of evaluator.
The Institutional Perspective.
The choice of evaluator depends on the role the
evaluator is expected to play in the evaluation. This role is
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defined by the characteristics of the institutional
arrangement for the evaluation. Two such roles have already
been described, e.g. the facilitator and the expert. In this
section I shall discuss the different roles of the evaluator
in relation to the involvement of donor and host country
institutions in evaluation of aid projects.
Michael Patton provides a definition of three possible
role models for evaluators with different "missions":
The first style is the "surveillance and compliance"
approach of aggressively independent and highly critical
auditors committed to getting the goods on a program. In
this type of evaluation, the evaluator is the Lone
Ranger and program personnel are potential and suspected
outlaws. The evaluator is on a mission of law
enforcement. The second style of evaluation is
epitomized by the aloof and value-free scientist who
focuses single mindedly on acquiring technically
impeccable data. The objective scientist is on a mission
seeking truth. Program personnel are research subjects
to be labeled and studied in accordance with the rules
of science. It is not so much a matter of the white hats
against the black hats as it is of the white laboratory
coats against ordinary street clothes. The third style
is where the evaluator works in a consultative,
consensus-building process to help policy-makers and
program personnel cooperatively and openly clarify their
information needs and use information to improve their
effectiveness. In this approach, evaluators and
information users are partners in the search for useful
information.131
There is evidence that evaluators who carry out
evaluations of donor funded development projects in the Third
World are often perceived - by project management and
involved government agencies - as assuming the "surveillance
and compliance" role. Often recipients of aid regard
131. Patton, 1982:58. This set of definitions is based on
Barkdoll, 1980.
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evaluation as an auditing or fault-finding process and may
fear that evaluations will lead to decreased aid, if the
evaluation come up with negative findings. This negative
image of evaluation among aid recipients is one of the
reasons why the donor agencies have dominated evaluation of
development projects.1 3 2 Project participants may also
perceive the evaluator as having a similar role. As pointed
out in a previous chapter, participants may not want to
provide information on sensitive issues to the evaluator out
of fear that it may be used punitively against them.
The resentment of the second role, the evaluator in the
laboratory coat, probably has less merit at the level of
project management and government agencies. Rather, potential
users of evaluation findings may respond to this evaluator
with indifference. Evidence from a number of studies1 3 3
suggests that knowledge produced by the scientist-evaluator
132. Other reasons explaining why aid recipients typically
have not invested resources in evaluation of donor-
funded development projects are 1) the different
priorities of donors and recipients for evaluation; 2)
the lack of influence of the recipient on design as
well as implementation; 3) the poor performance of some
evaluation missions undermining the trust between
recipient and donor, e.g. drastic changes of aid
policies based on superficial evaluations or reports
that allocate blame to governments and individuals; 4)
the use of evaluations as an instrument to terminate
policies or projects; and the lack of human and
financial resources. OECD, 1986:49.
133 These studies were based on the American experience. I
would argue, however, that such observations would be
at least as likely in a Third World context less
familiar with the scientific approach to decision-
making.
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may have less potential for utilization in decision-making
processes, regardless of its merit:
[A]s Caplan (1977) indicates, decision-makers appear
more likely to make decisions based on "soft" knowledge
considerations of the social impact of a particular
policy rather than on "hard" knowledge..."hard"
knowledge was defined as "research based, quantitative,
and couched in a scientific language"."'
Specifically, representatives from a host of developing
countries have expressed the need for a "common-sense
approach" and the view that evaluators should assume the role
of "activists" rather than "theoreticians"."'3 On the other
hand, the scientist-evaluator may be welcomed, since he or
she tends to disregard potentially sensitive issues, such as
political matters.
In regard to the project participants 'the objective
scientist' may not establish the feeling of trust necessary
for communication of personal information.
Evidence from the literature on project evaluation
suggests that the last role of the evaluator, as the
consensus-building consultant or the 'facilitator', is a
rarity. The rejection of an approach where "evaluators and
information users are partners in the search for useful
information" may at first seem odd, but some explanations can
be provided.
One explanation is the perception of the role of the
"'. Cook et al., 1980:489.
135. OECD, 1988:16.
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evaluator as seen by the evaluator. Many evaluators - with
different educational backgrounds - see -nemselves in the
role of the "expert" rather than the "servant". A sample
survey of program evaluators in the United States for example
revealed that the respondents tended to see their role as
that of an expert rather than a servant to program managers
or stakeholders. 136
A more compelling explanation is the differences that
exist between the understanding and purposes of evaluation as
seen by recipients and donors. The recipients, to the degree
they are interested in evaluation, see the evaluation as a
potential means for improving planning and implementation of
their own development plans, whereas the donors are mostly
concerned about improving the cost-effectiveness of their
development assistance, as discussed in chapter 2. In other
words there is a conflict of goals for the evaluation.
Following Michael Patton's model it is not the partnership
between the evaluator and the information-users that is at
stake - rather, it is the fundamental differences in purposes
between the two groups of information-users that prevents the
136. The survey used a stratified, random sample of the
membership directories of the Evaluation Network
and the Evaluation Research Society. Another
finding from the survey revealed that, although the
surveyed evaluators see themselves as experts,
there is a very low level of familiarity with
theory among the respondents. The authors conclude:
"Such findings suggest there is a danger of
scholarly illiteracy in evaluation about its own
writings and concepts." Shadish and Epstein, 1987.
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evaluator from assuming the role of consensus-building
consultant.137
The problems standing in the way of donor and recipient
partnership were highlighted at a recent seminar of the
Development Assistance Committee of OECD to which
representatives of 13 developing countries were invited.1 3
The donors and recipients each had an opportunity to present
their perspective on the 'state of the art' in evaluation of
aid projects. 3 '
Recipient country participants complained that donors
frequently want to carry out evaluations without taking
sufficient account of the recipients own needs and criteria
and thus give the host country an inadequate role in the
evaluation. Donors schedule evaluation at very short notice
or at inconvenient times during the budgetary cycle.
Furthermore, the absence of coordination between donors in
their scheduling makes it a common event that host countries
have several evaluation missions in the country at the same
137. This may explain why even agencies like SIDA (Sweden),
that have placed considerable emphasis on strengthening
local evaluation capacity , have experienced scant
interest for its support; OECD, 1986:48-9.
This provides a rare opportunity to hear the
perspective of the recipient countries on evaluation of
aid projects.
The members of DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the EEC.
139. OECD, 1988.
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time.
Participants representing the donor interests blamed the
lack of involvement of the recipient in evaluation on the
lack of sufficiently experienced staff due to competing
demands from other planning tasks.1 * When donors try to
identify local skills - in consulting firms, universities,
management and research institutes - as team members they are
exposed to accusations of imposing their own preferences,
instead of accepting people nominated by the local
authorities. Mixed teams also frequently experience
difficulties in reaching forceful conclusions on the
evaluation.
Another important factor of the institutional setting
for project evaluation in the Third World is the financing of
evaluations. The financial constraints of most host countries
are such that evaluations generally are funded by the donors.
This inequality may easily lead to dominance by the donor.
Both donors and recipients have expressed their desires
that more joint efforts will be made in the future.'1 '
Whether in reality a basis exists for reconciliation of the
140. The World Bank has on a separate occasion expressed
a similar sentiment, arguing that the recipient
countries have either failed to see the use of
evaluation, because of the long-term focus and the
cost involved, or that they are simply not capable
of addressing "the 'what happened and why'
questions systematically and forthrightly,..."
because of the constraints of an over-extended
bureaucracy. Weiner, 1984:128.
OECD, 1986 and 1988; Weiner, 1984.
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differences between donor and recipient shall remain
unanswered. On the part of the recipient, an inherent
resistance to evaluation on grounds of unwillingness to
suffer 'exposure' may prevent such reconciliation. On the
part of the donor, there may also be a fear of exposure, but
more likely, there may in reality be little incentive to
involve the recipient - for the sake of the recipient - if
donor agencies are generally satisfied with their own
evaluations. Some institutional arrangements can, however, be
suggested which may lead to a better balance between donor
and recipient in evaluations. Let us for a moment again turn
to the case of the Dandora project.
The monitoring and evaluation of the Dandora project was
an integral part of the project agreement between the
Government of Kenya and the World Bank. The evaluation was
carried out by a team of local consultants under the
coordination of an inter-ministerial/inter-agency steering
committee under the Ministry of Finance.1 4 2 While the
evaluation can be criticized on other accounts, the
institutional arrangement may provide some useful ideas. The
funding for the Dandora project was divided almost equally
between the Kenyan government and the Bank1 4 3 . If the funds
for the evaluation are a part of the total initial funding
142. Chana, 1984:28-9.
1*4. Rasmussen, 1987:21. This suggestion may prove of little
utility in situations where the recipient has a limited
economic stake in a project.
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for the project the dominance of the donor, often justified
by its role as funder, may be lessened.1"' Coordination of
the steering committee by a host-country ministry may further
increase the participation of the recipient. Likewise, local
consultants may have a more profound knowledge of the local
decision-making processes, and thus increase the likelihood
of utilization. The evaluation of the Dandora project
indicates that there is a role for the recipient to play in
evaluation of aid projects, provided the funds and the
institutional arrangements for the evaluation are part of the
project agreement.
A possible institutional approach to evaluation that
includes the recipient and the donor as well as others
affected by the evaluation is the 'stakeholder approach'.
This approach is based on the assumption that "people who
have a stake in an evaluation should be actively and
meaningfully involved in shaping the evaluation to focus it
on meaningful and appropriate issues, thereby increasing the
likelihood of utilization."1 4 5 But, what does it mean to
'have a stake' in an evaluation? Carol Weiss offers a
definition of a stakeholder:
1**. I have previously criticized the inclusion of a priori
definitive statements about how an evaluation should be
conducted in the terms of reference; this poses a
problem for a pre-project decision about how much to
set aside for evaluation. My suggestion here would be
based on a set percentage-figure.
145. Patton, 1987:116.
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I interpret the term stakeholder to mean either the
members of groups that are palpably affected by the
program and who therefore will conceivably be affected
by evaluative conclusions about the program or the
members of groups that make decisions about the future
of the program, such as decisions to continue or
discontinue funding or to alter modes of program
operation.14'
Some are very enthusiastic about the potential of
stakeholder participation. Jennifer Greene provides empirical
evidence from the American context that stakeholder
participation can have a considerable positive effect on
utilization1" 7 , and that for politically controversial
evaluation settings "it is particularly important to
establish from the outset a forum of policymakers and
stakeholders ... that can serve as a microcosm of the
political world into which the research will later cast their
results."'4 Others are less enthusiastic. Carol H. Weiss
provides a "tentative balance sheet" for stakeholder
evaluation.14 9 She points out that whereas the stakeholder
approach can improve the fairness of the evaluation process,
counter organizational tilts, democratize access to
evaluation information and equalize the potential power
14* Weiss, 1983:84. It should be noted that the term
program', used by Carol H. Weiss to define who should
be considered a stakeholder, is broader than the term 'project'
147. See also Patton, 1982:56-67. Michael Patton establishes
a rationale for consultative evaluation practice.
148 Kleinfeld and McDiarmid, 1986; quoted in Greene,
1988:110. See also Patton, 1982:55-98; and Patton,1987.
1**. Weiss, 1983:91-2.
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knowledge provides, it cannot bring harmony to contentious
program arenas - it may in fact make people even more aware
of the conflicts that exist. The stakeholder approach also
places new demands on peoples time and attention - an even
bigger problem in developing countries than in the American
context, for which the article was intended.
The real test of the feasibility of the stakeholder
approach is the willingness of those who hold power to share
it with those who do not. Are the donor agencies willing to
share their influence on the evaluation with the host country
agencies? And are the host country agencies willing to share
their influence at the community level? The answer to these
questions can only be empirically based.
Conclusion on institutional aspects of evaluation.
Although suggestions can be made for future
institutional arrangements that could change project
evaluation, the current reality is that the evaluations'
terms of reference often appear as part of the project
agreement and often list the type of evaluation to be
conducted, aspects of the project to be evaluated and
methodologies to be entertained. There is even evidence that
terms of reference for development projects "...are becoming
increasingly specific about the design and
implementation....,and usually require recommendations as
well as major findings." Should this trend continue,
is . OECD, 1986:11.
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considering the predominance of cost-effectiveness
evaluation, there may be little hope for different and better
evaluations. At the very least, there will be little left for
the evaluator to decide in terms of the nature of the
inquiry.
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CONCLUSION
The nine evaluation reports, I review in the paper, as
examples of the state of the art in evaluation of housing
projects in developing countries, have adopted four different
design strategies for evaluating a housing project. While
they differ in this respect they are alike in their, at best,
very superficial treatment of the socio-political context of
the projects they evaluate and, at worst, total neglect of
the influence of the context on the project process, outcome
and impact.
In the critique of the four evaluation designs and the
methods used for data collection and analysis I single out
four evaluations for scrutiny. Each of the designs used has
its own practical or theoretical problems, but the scientific
experimental design proves most inadequate for evaluating
social action programs, such as housing projects. This holds
true particularly for the Third World context. Most new
housing projects require active involvement of people in new
and unfamiliar roles. Evaluating such projects depends to a
large degree on understanding changes in attitude and
behavior. In this particular context quantitative, primarily
'knowledge verifying' methods are wholly unsuited. These
methods - adopted from scientific research - can in reality
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only invalidate a theory about a causal relationship. They do
not generate "new" knowledge.
The question of methodological choice is often seen as a
choice between quantitative and qualitative methods. The
solution is as often presented as a combination of "less-
than-perfect" variants of scientific research methods with
more innovative methods to make up for the shortcomings of
the former. I believe, that this solution is wrong. It
results from a failure to recognize the existence of two
different research paradigms, both of which use quantitative
and qualitative methods. The two paradigms, here termed the
scientific and the naturalistic paradigm, are based on
different philosophical premises, and must in many ways be
seen as antagonistic rather than supplementary.
Behind the choice among evaluation designs and research
paradigms lie two distinctly different approaches to
evaluation. I use the terms cost-effectiveness evaluation and
illuminative evaluation to describe these two approaches. The
nine evaluation studies, I review, are used as examples of
the two approaches. The two approaches have a great deal in
common with two distinctly different dictionary meanings of
the verb 'to evaluate'. Cost-effectiveness evaluation fits a
definition of evaluation meaning 'to appraise'; illuminative
evaluation fits a definition meaning 'to appreciate'. Whether
by 'to evaluate' we mean 'to appraise' or 'to appreciate' in
many ways determines our choice of design and research
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paradigm for evaluations.
Effective evaluation is, however, more than a
methodological problem. It also depends on an understanding
of the real world context in which the evaluation will be
carried out. Project evaluation has most often depended upon
evaluation methodologies developed in an American context.
Underlying assumptions about the political and administrative
environment, that fail to appreciate the typical Third World
context, are built into the evaluations. Rather than
providing a general outline of the politico-bureaucratic
context of developing countries I use my observations from a
stay in Kenya, where I studied the Dandora Sites and Services
Project and other low income housing projects in Nairobi, to
serve as a real-life example of the overriding importance of
including the socio-political context in evaluation.
A full appreciation of the context must also include an
understanding of the fundamental importance of gender issues
in evaluation. Paula Nimpuno's research on women's
participation in the Dandora sites and services project in
Nairobi points out the significant differences in the
experience of women and men in low income housing projects.
Data from other projects indicate that such differences are
common.
No one evaluator can easily fulfill the requirements
needed to do effective evaluation as outlined in this paper.
A team seems the obvious solution for combining the different
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skills, breadth of experience, and local understanding
necessary, and at the same time avoiding seriously biased
views. But, what may be ideal may not be possible. Scarcity
of funds may largely determine the choice of evaluator.
I argue that many of the shortcomings of evaluation are
tied to institutional constraints. The different agendas and
pressures on donors and recipients often stand in the way of
effective evaluation. Indications are that both donors and
recipients desire more joint evaluation efforts in the
future. Institutional approaches can be suggested, such as
joint financing and the stakeholder approach, that may help
overcome some institutional constraints. But, whether in
reality a basis exists for reconciliation of the differences
between donor and recipient is less clear. On the part of the
recipient, an inherent resistance to evaluation on grounds of
unwillingness to suffer 'exposure' may prevent such
reconciliation. On the part of the donor, there may also be a
fear of exposure, but more likely, there may be little
incentive to involve the recipient, if donor agencies are
generally satisfied with their own evaluations.
Considering the predominance of cost-effectiveness
evaluation, the current trend of increasingly specific
statements in the terms of reference of development projects,
about the type of evaluation to be conducted, may also limit
the hope for different and better evaluations.
Despite these constraints I believe that evaluation is
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the only effective way in which we can systematically learn
from our experience with development projects and not confine
this knowledge to a few. The critique presented in this
paper, of the state of the art in evaluation of housing
projects, is a contribution to an understanding of how
projects should be evaluated.
In his book "The Evaluation of Cultural Action" Howard
Richards describes the type of evaluation which, I believe,
grows out of the critique I have developed in this paper. I
can do no better than to end by borrowing from Richards'
conclusion:
Everything seemed clear to me in retrospect. The
evaluation of a programme, I now saw, consist to a large
extent of describing it in an illuminative way, in a way
that helps the reader to see it as if he or she were
there. The description should first be expressed in the
language of the participants themselves. To see how and
why.... change takes place, the viewpoints of the actors
who are changing, and an understanding of the conflicts
they are involved in, are indispensable. A quantitative
estimate of how much change is taking place and checking
- triangulating - to improve the accuracy of the picture
emerging from the description, are important but
secondary."'
151 Richards, 1985:242.
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APPENDIX I
PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION: THE EXAMPLE OF OXFAM AMERICA.
This appendix provides a brief introduction to the
concept of participatory evaluation, its advantages and
problems exemplified by the experience of Oxfam America.1
Oxfam's approach to evaluation is closely linked to the
ideology behind its development assistance strategy in
general.2 Self- and participatory evaluation plays an
important role - virtually all projects have some element of
self-evaluation and around half the projects choose a
participatory approach to evaluation. If, however, Oxfam
works with government agencies local Oxfam staff is usually
responsible for the evaluation. The typical isolation of many
- i.e. rural - Oxfam projects explains this arrangement, but
Oxfam's perception of government agency performance also
plays a role.' Projects are usually evaluated at the end of a
1. Oxfam America is an international agency that funds
self-help development projects and disaster relief in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, and also prepares and
distributes educational material for people in the
United States on the issues of development and hunger.
Oxfam America is one of seven autonomous Oxfams around
the world.
2. The description of Oxfam's approach to evaluation is
based on an interview with one of Oxfam's Regional
Directors, at Oxfam America Headquarters in Boston
(October 28, 1988).
3. Government agencies are described as typically having
the responsibility of too many other tasks and facing
too many other problems to be able to devote time to
Oxfam evaluation activities. One may also suspect that
2project-cycle - a 3-5 year commitment - if it is decided
funding should be continued. The overall use of 'ex-post
evaluation' is, however, rather limited - only around 10% of
all projects are evaluated.'
Ideally, participatory evaluation seeks to involve the
funding agency, any intermediate agency and the local grass-
roots organizations representing the project beneficiaries.
Participation is sought in identification of evaluation
objectives, definition of criteria and indicators for
assessing if objectives have been reached and - in the case
of self-evaluation - also in the actual collection and
analysis of data.'
Oxfam's evaluations tend to be biased towards gender,
ethnicity, race, class, and other disadvantaged groups, and
towards partnership and equality values. Furthermore, the
evaluations tend to be heavily biased towards process. The
feasibility of the policy implemented is considered of lesser
importance, e.g. economic viability and replicability of a
Oxfam does not want government biases to be reflected
in self-evaluations.
Other donors typically evaluate between 15-20% of their
projects every year, although the differences are
considerable. OECD, 1986:17.
According to "A Field Director's Handbook" (1985) -
published by Oxfam UK - in which guidelines are
provided for monitoring and evaluation, as well as a
host of other aspects of disaster relief and
development assistance. Oxfam America does not
necessarily follow these guidelines, rather they
represent the 'ideal'.
3project usually receives the benefit of the doubt and do not
become determining factors, when further funding is
considered. As expressed by one of Oxfam's regional directors
the evaluations tend to become matters of whether the project
beneficiaries have made a genuine effort to make the project
work.
A primary goal of Oxfam's evaluations is to help the
project, i.e. the evaluation serves as a planning exercise
for project management and beneficiaries. A secondary purpose
is to control that the money assigned to the project has been
spent well. But, evaluation findings are also meant to aid
Oxfam' board of directors and staff in the formulation of new
policies and in making choices about which projects to fund.
Oxfam staff does not follow specific guidelines for
evaluation design, since only a tentative policy exists for
how evaluations should be carried out.
Using self- and participatory strategies has, according
to one of Oxfam's regional directors , had the effect of
biasing Oxfam's evaluations." People tend to judge themselves
more positively ("less objectively"), wishing to retain
project benefits, even if the project is not cost-effective.
And, self-evaluations often only pronounce this problem. Such
bias is, however, not inherent to participatory evaluation,
and - as pointed out by the Regional Director - can be
6. Little empirical data exists, since Oxfam America's
evaluation studies have not been made available to the
public.
4remedied by assistance from outside evaluators "[..] who at
the same time are sensitive to the 'environment' and Oxfam's
policies."
The problem of bias is also sometimes aggravated by the
fact that Oxfam cannot guarantee that the local 'grass-roots'
organizations, Oxfam has chosen to work with, actually
represent the intended target-group. As documented by Tendler
(1982), in a study of 75 evaluations of PVO projects,
contradictory to the self-image of many PVO's, participation
often means top-down or 'outside-in' approaches through local
elites.' For obvious reasons - in particular if the
evaluation serves as input in decision making processes about
further funding - local elites will not point to such issues
as, or rate negatively, the project's ability to reach the
poorest of the poor, the project's truly participatory nature
or its ability to empower the broader base of the community.
Oxfam's bias towards process also has implications. As
Tendler points out, being biased towards process can place
Interview, October 28, 1988.
8. Tendler, by the way, does not see this as necessarily
negative. Successful projects include 1)cases where the
poor were reached and their lives improved although
strong local-elite leadership or the PVO itself
masterminded the activity, with little participation
involved; 2) cases where local elites or the middle
poor were reached, but substantial indirect benefits or
trickle-down affected the poor; or 3) cases where
better-off members of a community were provided a
service previously not available - even though no
attempts were made to reach the poorest of the poor,
and even though there were no spread effects. (Tendler,
1982:9-10).
5unnecessary constraints on an organization's ability to pose
evaluation questions:
The PVO, for example, may be less interested in whether
a community decided to initiate an agricultural
extension or a health program than it is in the way the
decision was made. Yet if one type of project works
better with participatory action than another--or if the
PVO is better at assisting in one area than another-
-then the type of activity is relevant to the successes
of the undertaking. Strong commitment to open-ended
processes of decisionmaking, in sum, may make it
difficult to think about evaluation questions of this
nature.
Tendler, 1982:22-3.
In this manner process bias actually defeats one very
important purpose of the evaluation activity, namely to
increase the knowledge about which projects not only
materially benefit the poor, but also which projects -
through participation - facilitates organization and
empowerment of the poor within their communities.
Not having organizational guidelines or standards has
had the effect that Oxfam's evaluation studies vary greatly
in scope, depth and general quality.9 One must suspect that
the incentive to carry out truly participatory evaluations -
including initiating training - will vary greatly in
accordance with the actual participatory nature of the
project, the time and financial constraints1 facing the
local field representative or project manager (depending on
~. Again, according to one of Oxfam' Regional Directors.
1 . Financial constraints of the project may inhibit the
hiring of an outside facilitator/evaluator.
6who has been given the ultimate responsibility for initiating
the evaluation), the potential problems experienced during
implementation with the participation component1", and - in
particular - serious disagreements among stakeholders about
the project.
Probably the most difficult aspect of participatory
evaluation is making sure that even findings that are
embarrassing or unwelcome to some stakeholders are included
in the evaluation.12 Anyanwu writes:
[..] because the participatory research approach is
generally problem-centred, the technique cannot be that
of mere data gathering, but must accommodate an active
endeavour to understand the conditions underlying
community problems, with a view to finding lasting
solutions to such problems.
Anyanwu, 1988:15.
In other words, participatory evaluation demands a lot
of attention on the part of the field and project staff.
Exactly because of its potential ability to bring even
unwanted or embarrassing facts out in the open a lot of
effort must be put into the training of involved parties to
understand the purpose and the processes of participatory
evaluation. Successful participatory evaluation depends on
As pointed out by the Regional Director, launching a
participatory evaluation - if the project itself could
not be characterized as participatory - is most likely
a wasted effort.
12. Feuerstein points out that the phenomena of
embarrassing or unwelcome findings may be the reason
why some evaluation reports suffer the fate of 'file
and forget' and the result are not shared. Feuerstein,
1988:22-3.
7reaching consensus on evaluation objectives and methodology,
on teaching evaluation methodologies to participants and on
gaining the acceptance of decentralization of decision-making
and power from all participants - including representatives
from intermediary agencies such as government agencies.1 3 The
potential of participatory evaluation also depends - as
Feuerstein notes - to a large degree on the role of the
participatory facilitator:
There can be areas which local people either forget to
look at, or do not want to look at. An outsider can play
an important role by asking the right kind of questions
and providing useful insights into dealing with dilemmas
and uncertainties. (emphasis added).
Feuerstein, 1988:23.
One of the most important aspects of participatory
evaluation is thus the facilitator's role as a negotiator
between the participants in the evaluation, e.g. the
government, agencies, project staff and participants.
In light of the difficulties that participatory
evaluation may entail it is easy to imagine - where no
guidelines exist - that a field representative will choose
not to opt for participatory evaluation.
Dissemination of findings.
According to the Regional Director the institutional
13. This last feature of participatory evaluation is the
most controversial; as Feuerstein (1988:16) notes,
while many people in development activities may be
ready to share responsibility, there are few who are
genuinely ready to share power.
8network of the organization is, however, very week and the
dissemination of findings is only informal and ad hoc.
Ironically, there are examples - for example from Oxfam
projects in India - that institutions elsewhere are stronger,
and findings have been utilized by local PVO's and government
agencies. In this respect evaluation findings may have a much
greater impact for knowledge dissemination in local areas
than for Oxfam itself. Oxfam hopes within the next 3 years to
establish a more systematic approach to evaluation and
dissemination internally, and also for usage by the PVO
community in general. An 'embryonic' approach is under way,
developing models for the response to disaster and the
evaluation of such disaster relief programs."1 Currently,
however, the dissemination of findings is very poor, which
affects Oxfam's ability to improve its policies consistently
with findings from the field, to the effect that policies
remain based mainly upon ideological considerations and
'anecdotal' evidence. It also affects Oxfam's ability to
participate in the debate with other development assistance
organizations about future aid policies, limiting the
circulation of experience with participatory evaluation to
larger donors such as the World Bank and USAID whose
evaluation strategies have not included participatory evaluation.
14. Three programs in the Philippines, India and Ecuador
provides empirical data for the study.
